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IN SEARCH OF A THEORY OF ALIMONY
John C. Sheldon*
Nancy Diesel Mills**
Foreword
It took us a year to research and write this article. As we were
putting the finishing touches on our final draft, however, the Maine
Supreme Judicial Court issued its decision in Henriksen v. Cam-
eron. That decision at once legitimized an ex-spouse's damage suit
against the other ex-spouse for an interspousal tort, and rendered
our discussion of the same subject moot.
Henriksen held principally that res judicata does not prevent one
ex-spouse from suing the other for personal injury the latter
caused during the marriage. Such a suit is cognizable independent
of the divorce. In the process, the majority of the court decided
that alimony cannot be used to compensate a spouse for such in-
jury. A dissent argued that it can.
We agree with the majority's position on alimony, but we dispute
their reasoning. For that reason, we have decided not to revise the
body of our Article, and we have left in place the arguments that
the majority in Henriksen mooted. Instead, we use those arguments
as a basis for a separate comment on Henriksen that appears after
the conclusion of the main article.
I. INTRODUCTION
Maine's alimony1 statute2 is full of good advice. It directs judges
who hear requests for alimony to "consider" all kinds of things, from
the parties' individual wealth to their individual health, from their
respective ages to their respective wages, from the length of their
marriage to the strength of their educations.3 And, as if to subdue
* Judge, Maine District Court
** Justice, Maine Superior Court
1. In this Article, the term "alimony" refers to post-divorce payments by one ex-
spouse for the support of the other ex-spouse. The term is therefore intended as a
synonym for "maintenance," "support," and "support and maintenance," to the ex-
tent that those terms refer to financial support paid after divorce. See Chester G.
Vernier and John B. Hurlbut, The Historical Background of Alimony Law and its
Present Statutory Structure, 6 LAw Am CoNrFMP. PROBS. 197, 202 (1939).
2. MF_ REv. STAT. ANN. tit 19, §§ 721-22 (West 1981 & Supp. 1992-1993).
3. Ma. Rav. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 721 (West Supp. 1992-1993):
1. Factors. The court shall consider the following factors when determining an
award of alimony.
A. The length of the marriage;
B. The ability of each party to pay,
C. The age of each party;,
D. The employment history and employment potential of each party;,
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any doubt about the breadth of this assignment, the statute then
invites judges to take into account "any other factors the court con-
siders appropriate."4 In short, the statute grants judges almost un-
limited discretion in awarding alimony.
Power notwithstanding, however, anyone who reads the statute
looking for a reason for awarding alimony will search in vain. Hav-
ing effusively advised judges on what to consider in contemplating
an award of alimony, the statute is silent on the greater issue: why
award alimony at all? What theoretical purpose is alimony supposed
to serve; for what theoretical end is alimony a means?5
The Maine Legislature's failure to define the purpose of alimony
shifts the obligation to do so to the courts. By giving trial judges
broad discretion to award alimony while leaving unstated alimony's
ultimate purpose, the alimony statute implicitly assigns judges the
responsibility for discovering and articulating the justification for
E. The income history and income potential of each party;
F. The education and training of each party;
G. The provisions for retirement and health insurance benefits of each party;
H. The tax consequences of the division of marital property, including the tax con-
sequences of the sale of the marital home, if applicable;
I. The health and disabilities of each party;
J. The tax consequences of an alimony award;
K. The contributions of either party as homemaker;
L. The contributions of either party to the education or earning potential of the
other party;
M. Economic misconduct by either party resulting in the diminution of marital
property or income;
N. The standard of living of the parties during the marriage; and
0. Any other factors the court considers appropriate.
2. Costs and attorney's fees. The court may order either party to pay the costs
and attorney's fees of the other party in the defense or prosecution of a divorce.
3. Real Estate. The court may order any part of the obligated party's real estate
and, if necessary, the rents and profits from that real estate to be assigned and set
out to the other party for life.
4. Alternative to alimony. Instead of alimony, the court may order either party
to pay a specific sum to the other party, as the court may direct.
5. Modification. The court, at any time, may alter or amend a decree for alimony
or specific sum when it appears that justice requires it, except that a court shall not
increase the alimony if the original decree prohibits an increase. In making any alter-
ation or amendment, the court shall consider the factors listed in subsection 1.
6. Enforcement. The court may use all necessary legal provisions to enforce its
decrees.
7. Limitations. This section does not limit the court, by full or partial agreement
of the parties or otherwise, from awarding alimony for a limited period, from award-
ing alimony which may not be increased regardless of subsequent events or conditions
or otherwise limiting or conditioning the alimony award in any manner or term that
the court considers just.
4. Id. § 721(l)(0).
5. This problem is not unique to Maine: "[N]o one can explain convincingly who
should be eligible to receive alimony, even though it remains in almost every jurisdic-
tion." Ira Mark Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 CAL. L. REv. 1, 4-5 (1989).
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their use of such power.6 The benefit of assigning this analysis pro-
cess to judges is that a reasoned, informed consensus about the pur-
pose of alimony ought to emerge, without the distorting influence of
partisan politics. The disadvantage, on the other hand, is that the
consensus will not emerge quickly or efficiently. Rather, the courts
will grope and feel their way in a glacially-paced, stop-and-go, case-
by-case effort to formulate social policy without appearing to
legislate.
Our aim in this Article is to reduce the groping by providing some
illumination. We believe that a nationwide consensus about the pur-
pose of alimony, in broad outline, may be emerging, and we propose
here to report our interpretation of it.
As it is presently understood, the purpose of alimony is the pre-
vention of unfairness by forcing ex-spouses to share all of the eco-
nomic gains and losses that have been produced by the marriage but
that are realized after the divorce.
Alimony, therefore, serves a purpose that is distinct from that
served by splitting up the parties' real and personal property in the
divorce order. Statutes that provide divorce courts with this latter
power are, to be sure, usually designed to promote fairness between
the parties.' Thus, a court may award to the homemaker spouse a
share of the wage earner spouse's pension in order to recognize and
protect the homemaker's contribution to the marital enterprise.8
However, the scope of such statutes (or the interpretation of that
scope by the courts) is often too narrow," and the remedies they au-
thorize are often too few, to do ultimate fairness to divorcing
spouses in all cases. This is because there are economic conse-
quences to a marital relationship that have nothing to do with prop-
erty or that may not appear until well after the divorce court has
6. See Keith Hawkins, Discretion in Making Legal Decisions, 43 WAsH. & Las L
REv. 1161, 1173 (1986):
[L]egislatures are often unwilling or unable to be specific about the precise
nature of the social or economic ills which they wish to control, the degree
of control which they wish to be exerted, or precisely how the costs and
burdens involved are to be borne. Instead they leave the precise formula-
tion of administrative rules and standards to officials who are allocated sub-
stantial discretion both to make policy and to enforce that policy ....
7. Subsection I of M& Rav. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 722-A (West 1981 & Supp. 1992-
1993), the Marital Property Act, requires trial judges to "divide the marital property
in such proportions as the court deems just. . . ." The "deems just" language re-
quires the trial court division to "be guided by equitable principles." Stevens v. Ste-
vens, 390 A.2d 1074, 1076 (Me. 1978).
8. Marquis v. Chartier, 592 A.2d 169, 171 n.3 (Me. 1991).
9. "Courts which adhere rigidly to what they perceive to be the legal definition of
marital property prevent themselves from using the equitable powers granted them in
many equitable distribution statutes; their vision is too narrow." Deborah A. Batts,
Remedy Refocus: In Search of Equity in "Enhanced Spouse/Other Spouse" Di-
vorces, 63 N.Y.U. L Rxv. 751, 798 (1988).
1993]
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lost the authority to distribute property. For example, the wage
earner may have improved his or her own earning power during the
marriage while the homemaker did not; increased earning power is
not a property issue,10 but it is a palpable economic consequence of
the marital relationship of which the homemaker cannot fairly be
denied a share.' Similarly, a post-divorce custodial parent's employ-
ment options may be severely limited by the very inconvenience of
custody; not only is this not a property issue, but it is a consequence
that may not materialize for years after the divorce. Absent alimony,
there may be no statutory remedy for inequities such as these. In
the end, we conclude that alimony is a vehicle, peculiar to divorce,
by which courts may prevent the variety of forms of unjust enrich-
ment that are the peculiar consequences of marriage.
This characterization of alimony as preventing unjust enrichment
facilitates a variety of interesting discoveries about the nature of our
subject. Perhaps the least surprising is this one: alimony has nothing
to do with the historically affirmative duty of men to support
women. More subtle is this point: the only post-divorce economic
need that alimony addresses is that created by the termination of
the marriage; alimony is not available as a panacea for post-divorce
need in general. And Maine's droll apothegm on alimony, "[a]limony
is intended to fill the needs of the future, not to compensate for the
deeds of the past,"'1 2 is misleading.
Our discussion of these and other issues about alimony follows the
general outline of this introduction. We begin with a brief discussion
about the difference between considerations in awarding alimony
and the purpose of alimony in general, illustrating that difference
with references to historical views on the subject. We then proceed
with an attempt to isolate and identify the purpose of alimony by
the use of factual hypotheticals. The process is fact intensive, be-
cause the ultimate goal of alimony, the prevention of unfairness, is
fact intensive. To be sure, we will not begin to define unfairness; we
will illustrate it, and offer to define its remedy.
Finally, we will examine recent Maine Law Court decisions on ali-
mony in an effort to discover how far along the trail toward defining
the purpose of alimony the Law Court has gotten. If the answer is,
not very far at all, it is because the inquiry itself into the nature of
alimony is brand new, intimidatingly complex, and nowhere near
10. Maine's Marital Property Act applies to tangible and intangible assets that
have market value. No Maine caselaw-or caselaw from any other state that we know
of-defines earning power as "property."
11. Lenore Weitzman, one of this country's leading authorities on divorce and its
aftermath, refers to such things as professional training, job seniority, employment
security and future earning capacity as "career assets." See LENORE J. WITZMAN,
THE DIVORCE REvOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES
FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA 111 (1985).
12. Skelton v. Skelton, 490 A.2d 1204, 1207 (Me. 1985).
[Vol. 45:283
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completion. Defining the purpose of alimony involves profound de-
bate about the very nature of divorce itself. Salient issues in the
debate would be whether marriage alone justifies post-divorce sup-
port,"3 whether post-divorce support is a personal or a societal obli-
gation,14 whether the once-revolutionary clean break theory of di-
vorce remains viable, 5 what the theoretical relationship is between
13. "[Ihe fact of marriage itself is not reason to justify placing any obligation on
an ex-spouse." Joan M. Krauskopf, Theories of Property Division/Spousal Support:
Searching for Solutions to the Mystery, 23 FAL LQ. 252, 262 (1989). Our experience,
however, is that judges frequently require at least temporary alimony whenever the
means of divorcing spouses are substantially unequal; the only explanation for these
decisions is that the divorce (and, necessarily, the marriage it ends) justifies alimony.
14. Professor Ira Ellman argues that need per se is not a basis for alimony. Under
his version of alimony theory, the issue is "whether the wife invested in her marriage
[by working as a homemaker rather than by pursuing a career outside of the home]
and is thereby economically disadvantaged upon divorce;. . . not... need per se.
The wife who invested little or whose need arose from events unrelated to her mar-
riage would have no claim against her former husband." Ellman, supra note 5, at 52.
See infra text following note 39.
On the other hand, Sally Goldfarb, a staff attorney for the National Organization of
Women, argues that alimony should be available after marriage in order to compen-
sate women for their inferior opportunities in the marketplace for jobs. She argues:
cep]
[W]here it is impossible for both parties to maintain the marital standard
of living because of the added expenses of supporting two households in-
stead of one [after divorce], basic fairness requires that this reduction in
standard of living be shared between the two parties rather than allowing
all of the disadvantages to accrue to the wife. Equalizing the two parties'
postdivorce standards of living when awarding alimony is a crucial tool for
achieving this result.
Sally F. Goldfarb, Marital Partnership and the Case for Permanent Alimony, 27 J.
F Ah L 351, 365 (1988-89) (citations omitted). She then notes the "limited employ-
ment opportunities for women" after divorce, arguing that "[tlhe majority of women
in the labor force are concentrated in traditionally female occupations with low pay
and little opportunity for advancement." Id. at 367. This being so, she argues for
permanent rather than rehabilitative alimony. This, of course, is a theory of alimony
that places the financial onus of women's post-divorce need on individual men, re-
gardless of the fact that that need is generated by cultural factors beyond the individ-
ual man's ability to control See infra discussion accompanying note 57.
Professor Stephen Sugarman has observed that "one of the important controversies
about divorce law is why it ought to serve to reduce inequalities between the sexes
arising fr;m forces outside the marriage relationship." Stephen D. Sugarman, Divid-
ing Financial Interests on Divorce, DIVORcE REFoRM AT TM CROSSROADS 130, 154
(Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma H. Kay, eds.).
15. Commenting on the divorce reforms that swept the country in the late 1960
and early 1970s, Professor Suzanne Reynolds has observed that "commentators in-
volved in the reform movement apparently assumed that property awards would re-
main nonmodifiable and extolled the virtues of property division as the superior
means of making economic adjustments at divorce largely on the basis of its
nonmodifiability." Suzanne Reynolds, The Relationship of Property Division and Al-
imony: The Division of Property to Address Need, 56 Foiwnam L Rav. 827, 834
(1988). As a result, she argues, "[tihe judiciary appears to have concluded that the
availability of no-fault divorce has redefined marriage so that spouses no longer as-
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awards of alimony and of marital property, 6 and how to cope with
the pervasive concern for the "feminization of poverty."'1 Thus, we
conclude that our own thesis about alimony is only a first step, for
as quickly as we think that we have an answer to one question about
alimony, another more difficult one pops up. There is a great deal of
thinking yet to be done about the subject and the arguments we set
forth here are just a first step.
II. "CONSIDERATIONS" VERSUS PURPOSE
Alimony is the court-ordered financial support of one ex-spouse
by the other.'8 It is derived from the unwritten Ecclesiastical law of
nineteenth century England. Prior to 1857,1' Ecclesiastical courts in
England commonly granted what was called divorce a mensa et
thoro, on the ground of either adultery or cruelty.20 Such divorces
did not terminate the marriage; instead, the marriage continued
with the parties living apart." Because the marriage continued, the
husband's common law obligation to support his wife also continued,
and it was the custom that the support payments from the former to
the latter be periodic. 2
In form, alimony today remains the same as it was under the Ec-
clesiastical courts: customarily, periodic payments of support after a
divorce. 23 In theory, however, the concepts are unrelated. Alimony
under a divorce a mensa et thoro was supposed to be a substitute
for the common law duty of support-a substitute that was justified
by the fact that the marriage continued after the "divorce." Thus,
alimony under Ecclesiastical law was an incident of the marriage.
Modern alimony, on the other hand, exists independent of the mar-
sume that they may have commitments to the other that survive divorce." Id. at 904.
She concludes that this clean-break theory of divorce often works a disadvantage,
usually to women.
16. See generally Reynolds, supra note 15 (analyzing the relationship between
awards of alimony and of marital property).
17. This phrase was developed by Lenore Weitzman to describe the results of a
study she conducted on the effect of divorce on women in California following divorce
reform. Her conclusion was that divorce generally disadvantages women, especially
those who are assigned the custody of their children. See WEITZMAN, supra note 11, at
400-401 (1985).
18. Alimony is different, therefore, from the financial support one spouse pays to
another after separation but short of divorce; in Maine law, such support is called
"separate support." ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 693 (West 1981).
19. The Divorce Act of 1857 "ousted the Ecclesiastical courts of divorce jurisdic-
tion, and. . . established the absolute divorce by judicial decree." Vernier and Hurl-
but, supra note 1, at 198.
20. Id. at 197-98.
21. Id. at 198; Note, Alimony, Till Death Do Us Part, 27 J. FAit. L. 859 (1988-89).
22. Vernier and Hurlbut, supra note 1, at 198.
23. Alimony need not be periodic, but at least in Maine if it is not periodic it is
not called alimony. Instead it is called "a specific sum." ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19,
§ 721(4) (West Supp. 1992-1993).
.[Vol. 45:283
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riage, because a spouse's eligibility for alimony arises only if and
when the marriage actually ends. Thus, in modern usage, alimony is
an incident of the divorce, not of the marriage.
This distinction has important consequences for the study of ali-
mony theory. Historically, the theory of alimony was indistinguish-
able from this theory of marriage:
The doctrine of alimony springs up necessarily out of the soil of
our law, by reason of the peculiar property relation which it estab-
lishes between husband and wife. Upon the marriage, the husband
has vested in him all the present available means of the wife, to-
gether with the right to claim her future earnings and acquisitions.
At the same time, the law casts upon him the duty suitably to
maintain his wife, according to his ability and condition in life
.... The husband cannot abandon his duty to support his wife;
therefore, when the law in any case judges that she may live apart
from him, for her protection, in consequence of his wrong doing, it
must also judge that he shall maintain her while doing so.21
The purpose of alimony in the nineteenth century, then, was to
enforce the husband's incontrovertible duty to support his wife. On
the other hand, there were "considerations" that could affect an ali-
mony award. One was the wife's means:
[W]here, in consequence of a settlement, or otherwise, the property
of the wife has been kept in her hands, and has not vested in her
husband, and her own estate is fully equal to what she can justly
demand from the common fund, the reason for allowing her this
kind of support fails, and she is not entitled to it. If her estate is
partly adequate, it goes so far to reduce her claim.2'
Another issue was the husband's means: "There are circumstances
in which, she having means, and he being destitute and unable to
earn money, it may be her legal duty to support herself."20 Yet an-
other consideration was the respective moralities of the parties: if
the wife was an adulterer, she forfeited all claim to alimony, whereas
if the husband was the wrongdoer the price he had to pay in ali-
mony might go up.2 7 The husband's alimony obligation might also
wander upward if he had acquired wealth from his wife by virtue of
their marriage. 8 Such considerations as these could increase, de-
crease, or cut off alimony, but they were plainly distinct from the
purpose of alimony, which derived from society's view of the rela-
tionship between men and women in marriage.
24. Joel Prentiss Bishop, CO~MIENTARIS ON THE LAW OF MIARIAGE AND DivoRca
§ 369, at 295-96 (1864) (footnotes omitted).
25. Id. § 375, at 300 (footnote omitted).
26. Id. § 369, at 295 (footnote omitted); Vernier and Hurlbut, supra note 1, at
202.
27. Vernier and Hurlbut, supra note 1, at 199.
28. Id.
1993]
MAINE LAW REVIEW
Historically, then, alimony was a function of marriage, and its
purpose was interrelated with the purpose of marriage. Nowadays,
on the other hand, alimony exists independent of marriage, so its
theoretical purpose must be independent of any intra-marital obli-
gation of one spouse to the other. Identifying that purpose, however,
is a mercurial task. Consider this statement about alimony by the
Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court:
The purpose of alimony is to provide maintenance and support
for the payee spouse. While traditionally an alimony award "sought
to continue the parties' financial relations to 'maintain the wife in
the station in life to which she belongs,'" current law requires the
court to consider the "payee's training, experience, and capacity for
self-support ... as well."'
But this does not define alimony's purpose. The first sentence
merely describes alimony's effect. The court's subsequent statement
of the traditional objective of alimony, to "maintain the wife in the
station in life to which she belongs," is true enough,30 but it ignores
the fact that, in the most traditional sense, alimony had nothing to
do with the kind of complete and final divorce that the court was
reviewing in that case. Furthermore, the discussion of this tradition
devolves into a recitation of facts "to consider," without overt reflec-
tion on the shift in focus that has occurred in the middle of the
second sentence: The first phrase focuses on the reason for the exis-
tence of the alimony remedy, whereas the second focuses narrowly
on the facts of the case.
Of course, the theory of alimony has changed since the days of the
divorce a mensa et thoro. So have theories of marriage, the relation-
ship between spouses,31 divorce,3 2 and ultimately, the relationship
between men and women. These issues, in fact, continue to change,
and will probably remain unsettled for the foreseeable future.33 We
29. Lee v. Lee, 595 A.2d 408, 411 (Me. 1991) (quoting Skelton v. Skelton, 490 A.2d
1204, 1207 (Me. 1985)).
30. See quotation in text accompanying note 24, supra.
31. See Goldfarb, supra note 14, at 354 (footnotes omitted) ("In sharp contrast to
Blackstone's famous common law formulation that 'the husband and wife are one
person in law' and that the woman's legal existence is merged into the man's at mar-
riage, the modem view is that marriage is a partnership of equals.").
32. See, e.g., Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: A Perspective on No-
Fault Divorce and its Aftermath, 56 CINN. L. REv. 1 (1987).
33. Consider this statement as evidence of how much things have changed in the
last 20 years:
Proponents of the ERA in the 1970s shared a common vision of equality
between women and men that was premised on their equal treatment
before the law. Except where sex-specific traits were involved, they wished
to prohibit the use of sex as a basis for classification. The vision of equality
held by feminists in the 1980s is no longer a unified one, nor is it limited to
the achievement of formal equality of treatment. The focus has shifted
from a recounting of the similarities between women and men to an exami-
[Vol. 45:283
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live in a world in which the principle of gender equality and the fact
of male domination in business, politics, and education (to name a
few fields) produce a constantly changing, and persistently roiled,
social riptide. The historical basis for alimony has long disappeared,
but it has not been replaced with any identifiable constant. This fact
provokes our inquiry into the present purpose of alimony. We as-
sume-we intuit-that the justification for alimony is derived from
some element or aspect of the relationship between the spouses.3
1I IN SEARCH OF A THEORY OF ALIMONY
If the justification of alimony derives from the spousal relation-
ship, hypotheticals illustrating that relationship will aid in the
search for a theory of alimony. We begin the search with a factual
hypothetical that first brought the question of the purpose of ali-
mony to our attention.
The Diabetic Schoolteacher. Gender-Based Alimony and Need-
Based Alimony.
Husband and Wife were married in 1968, just after they both
graduated from college. Husband's military draft status was 4-F,
ineligible because of his diabetes, a condition that had been diag-
nosed while he was in high school and before the parties ever met.
They moved to Maine in 1971 and became schoolteachers at a pri-
vate boarding schooL Because they were able to live in school-
owned quarters as dorm-parents, they never bought their own
home. Nor did they ever have any children.
In 1987 Husband, then a Latin teacher, lost his job when the
administration dropped Latin from the school curriculum. In 1991
Wife sued for divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences.
At that time, both parties owned vested pensions, but Wife's was
nation of what differences between them should be taken into account
under what circumstances in order to achieve a more substantive equality.
Kay, supra note 32, at 2 (1987).
Things continue to change, as this discussion of the splintering of the feminist
movement illustrates:
For more than a decade, African-American feminists have been saying that
the abortion rights movement has not been speaking to their concerns; that
pro-choice leaders have not paid sufficient attention to forced sterilization,
lack of prenatal care, lack of support for children in poverty, and other
policies that limit the choices of poor women .... [T]he abortion rights
movement has focused narrowly on the single issue of the formal right to
"choose" an abortion, while it continues to ignore issues of affordability. It
is not enough for the movement's leadership to acknowledge splintering
among women on the abortion issue. Instead, feminists need to ask whether
particular groups of disadvantaged women have been left out of the femi-
nist union by the essentialist way in which the priorities of the movement
have been constructed.
Ruth Colker, The Example of Lesbians: A Posthumous Reply to Professor Mary Joe
Frug, 105 HARv. L. Ray. 1084, 1093-94 (1992) (footnotes omitted).
34. See infra text accompanying note 57.
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bigger than Husband's because of her longer employment; neither
pension was yet adequate for retirement, however. Husband has
since found a job teaching English in another school. Wife now
earns $28,000 per year, and Husband $25,000.
By the time of the divorce hearing, Husband's diabetic condition
had worsened. His doctor has told him that he may lose his sight
within five years, and may by then suffer the amputation of one or
both legs. His eligibility for Social Security remains uncertain be-
cause he is not yet disabled. He is thus unqualified to apply for
benefits, and the Social Security Administration refuses to specu-
late about his eligibility absent a bona fide application.
Both parties are forty-five. Aside from their pensions, neither
party has any significant property. Neither has remarried or has
any plans to do so in the near future. Husband wants one dollar
per year alimony against the possibility of his total disability.
This example presents a variety of issues. The first is the issue of
gender. Does it make any difference that the party seeking alimony
is male rather than female? Constitutionally, it should not; statutes
that limit alimony to women are unconstitutional." On another
plane, however, the issue becomes murkier. It has recently been ar-
gued by Sally Goldfarb, Staff Attorney for the National Organiza-
tion for Women, that permanent alimony should be available to
women for the reason, in part, that women are disadvantaged in the
marketplace.3 8 In our example, therefore, and at least according to
that theory, the husband's greater market advantage-he can teach,
he can sell shoes, he can make out income tax returns for H. & R.
Block, whereas she presumedly lacks that variety of op-
tions-diminishes his claim for alimony. We consider that thesis, as
a general theory of alimony, flawed because its rationale is indistin-
guishable from the archaic duty of men to support women; whereas
formerly the husband's duty to support the wife derived from the
individual man's ownership of the woman's property, now it is sup-
posed to derive from men's institutional control of the marketplace.
Since the marketplace is the source of property for most people,
Goldfarb's argument sounds like a clone of the nineteenth century
text quoted above: that male domination of property creates in the
male the obligation to pay alimony.3 7 We do not reject Goldfarb's
35. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979); Beal v. Beal, 388 A.2d 72 (Me. 1978).
36. Sally F. Goldfarb, Marital Partnership and the Case for Permanent Alimony,
27 J. FAm. L. 351 (1988-89). "In the absence of adequate long-term alimony, the eco-
nomic facts of life for divorced women are grim .... The majority of women in the
labor force are concentrated in traditionally female occupations with low pay and
little opportunity for advancement." Id. at 367.
37. Ms. Goldfarb denies that her theory of alimony is akin to the traditional obli-
gation of men to support women. Id. at 364. She maintains that when a woman mar-
ries and leaves employment to raise the couple's family, she "transfers" to her hus-
band her employment capacity and thus her earning capability; his subsequent
increase in income, salary, benefits, marketability-all of the incidents of a successful
[Vol. 45:283
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theory as a consideration in awarding alimony, but only as a general
pretext for alimony's availability as a remedy in divorce.
Gender, therefore, is unavailable as a foundation for alimony ei-
ther constitutionally or culturally. As far as we have been able to
determine, there is no other current argument that gender should
control the theory of alimony. We conclude that the fact that the
Diabetic Schoolteacher is male creates neither theoretical support
for, nor a theoretical bar to, his request for alimony. In the search
for a theoretical basis for alimony, gender proves immaterial.
The second obvious issue that our example raises is post-divorce
need. If the husband loses his eyesight, his legs, or any combination
thereof, he may become unemployed, at least temporarily unemploy-
able, and non-self-sufficient. If that happens, he could turn to his
former wife for support, provided that the divorce decree has
career-are partially the result of this "transfer of human capital." Id. at 359, 362.
Thus, Goldfarb argues, "[tihe wife increases her husband's earning capacity at the
expense of her own." Id. at 359 (italics omitted). When the parties divorce, the ex-
wife is left in a permanent financial hole, since she can never recover the years of
employability she lost. Id. at 371. Therefore, the ex-wife should be eligible for perma-
nent alimony from the ex-husband, since it is up to her former husband to transfer
back to her, forever, the marketability she permanently forsook.
Goldfarb's ideas about alimony frequently sound like our notion of preventing un-
just enrichment. We are uncomfortable with her "transfer" analysis, however, because
it seems to be a ficti6n for example, when a female nurse marries a male surgeon and
retires from nursing to raise a family, absolutely nothing of the surgeon's future pro-
fessional success is due to the former nurse's transfer to him of her employment
capacity.
Furthermore, Goldfarb blames the permanency of the ex-wife's financial hole in
part on the nature of the marketplace: not only is the ex-wife years behind in career
development because of the sacrifice during the marriage, but she is gender-disadvan-
taged as well. "At divorce, limited employment opportunities for women compound
the effect of the transfer of earning potential from one spouse to the other." Id. at
367 (citation omitted). Thus, "[t]he realities of divorced women's economic condition
dictate that permanent alimony awards should be made available to equalize the
postdivorce standards of living of the parties." Id. at 372. To the extent that Goldfarb
relies on the disadvantageous nature of the marketplace to justify permanent alimony
(and it is hard to tell how much she relies on it because she does not break down her
analysis quantitatively) she is arguing that men should support women.
We reiterate that Goldfarb's argument is for permanent alimony, rather than tem-
porary, or "rehabilitative," alimony. She claims that rehabilitative alimony-alimony
designed to last as long as it takes women to get the training necessary to give them
the career advantages they lost while serving as homemakers-doesn't work, because
women are at such a disadvantage ab initio.
See also Mary Joe Frug's x-rated discussion of the issue of employment disadvan-
tage in Mary Jo Frug, A Postmodern Feminist Legal Manifesto (An Unfinished
Draft), 105 HAv. L Rv. 1045, 1072 (1992). But see Jane Ellis, Surveying the Ter-
rain: A Review Essay of Divorce Reform at the Crossroads, 44 STA. L REV. 471, 501
(1992) ("The evidence that market discrimination is not the most significant cause of
women's relatively low earning capacities is as strong, however, if not stronger, than
the evidence that it is.").
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awarded him at least some-even nominal-alimony. 8 Does need
provide a theoretical justification for alimony?
Some argue that it does not. Professor Ira Ellman has recently
proposed that the purpose of alimony is to encourage spouses to
maximize their economic potential, by "reallocat[ing] the
postdivorce financial consequences of marriage in order to prevent
distorting incentives."39 Ellman believes that most married couples
allocate their contributions to the marriage on an economic basis:
husbands, who generally can earn more, work out of the home and
earn, while wives, who generally cannot earn as much, do housework
and earn little or nothing. During the marriage, this works to the
benefit of both spouses (especially where the husband has a much
greater earning potential) because it maximizes income, something
that Ellman thinks should be encouraged. Unfortunately for the
wife, however, such an arrangement works to her disadvantage if the
spouses divorce, because the husband leaves the marriage with the
earning power he amassed during the marriage, while the wife has
nothing of the sort. Ellman argues that she should be compensated
with alimony for that fact, which he calls her "marital
investment. "40
If alimony exists for that purpose alone, then it has nothing to do
with post-divorce need, according to Ellman. If the wife has made a
"marital investment" like the one described above, she receives ali-
mony to compensate her for that investment, whether she needs it
or not. If she is independently wealthy, she is entitled to the ali-
mony anyway. If she did not make a "marital investment" then she
receives no alimony, even if she is not self-sufficient; her support in
such a case is a societal obligation, not a personal one to the ex-
husband.41
Ellman's theory of alimony contradicts Maine caselaw primarily
because the former is entirely retrospective, whereas the latter limits
alimony to prospective purposes only. According to the Law Court's
1985 decision in Skelton v. Skelton,'42 spouses receive compensation
for contributions to the marital enterprise through a division of
38. Under the alimony provisions of most state statutes, alimony cannot be
awarded initially in a post-divorce proceeding. An alimony award, however small, can
be increased after divorce, but a divorce decree that denies or fails to provide for
alimony may not be amended later to add alimony (unless the omission was some sort
of oversight or clerical error). Plummer v. Plummer, 137 Me. 39 (1940); see also An-
notation, Domestic Divorce Decree Without Adjudication as to Alimony, Rendered
on Personal Service or Equivalent, as Precluding Later Alimony Award, 43 A.L.R.2D
1387 (1992).
39. Ellman, supra note 5, at 50.
40. Id. at 51.
41. Id. at 52.
42. 490 A.2d 1204 (Me. 1985).
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marital assets; alimony may only serve post-divorce need."3 In Skel-
ton, the parties were divorced after nine years of marriage. They
then lived together for six years, remarried, and divorced again after
a two and one-half year second marriage. After awarding custody of
the parties' three children to Mrs. Skelton and dividing marital
property, the trial court awarded alimony to Mrs. Skelton because
"the only way [she] can be compensated for her many years as
mother and homemaker is by the award of alimony."" The Law
Court remanded the case for reexamination of the alimony award
because the trial judge erroneously awarded alimony to compensate
the wife for, essentially, eighteen years of marriage. The court con-
cluded that: "Alimony is intended to fill the needs of the future, not
to compensate for the deeds of the past.""'
But consider this example:
The Sacrificing Nurse: Alimony Entitlement Absent Need.
Husband and Wife were married in 1980, when he was earning
$85,000 per year as an anaesthesiologist and she was earning
$21,000 as a registered nurse on a ward of the local hospital-the
only such institution in the vicinity. Soon after the marriage, she
was offered the job of assistant chief of nursing at the hospital,
which would have entitled her to a starting annual salary of
$35,000. (No nepotism was involved.) However, Husband and Wife
wanted children soon, and in anticipation of the demands of her
new family, Wife declined the offer.
After twelve years of marriage and two children, now eleven and
nine, Husband sued for divorce. The superior position offered Wife
in 1981 was then no longer available, and she had lost her seniority
on the nursing staff, so if she were to return to nursing at the hos-
pital where she used to work she would have to accept a starting
salary of $22,000. (Had she remained a nurse on a ward throughout
her marriage she would now be earning $33,000 per year.) Husband
is now earning $270,000 annually. Wife will get custody of the
children.
43.
Is alimony properly awarded to compensate a divorcing spouse for her
"years of service" in the past, or does it look to the future, acting as a
substitute for the loss of support enjoyed during the preceding years... ?
The answer is clearly the latter.
[T]he extent of the wife's contribution to the marriage is relevant not to an
award of alimony... but to a disposition of property under 19 M.R.S.A-
§ 722-A (1981).
Id. at 1207-1208 (quoting Baker v. Baker, 444 A.2d 982, 984 (Me. 1982)). Maine's
alimony statute was amended in 1990 to permit trial judges to award alimony on the
basis of "[t]he contributions of either party as homemaker. Mn. Rv. STAT. ANX tit.
19, § 721(1)(K) (West Supp. 1992-1993).
44. Skelton v. Skelton, 490 A.2d at 1206.
45. Id. at 1207.
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Plainly, the wife here is entitled to substantial child support. As-
suming that there is insufficient marital property available to rectify
the financial inequities this marriage has produced, 6 it would also
appear beyond dispute that she is entitled to alimony. If Skelton is
correct, her entitlement to alimony depends entirely on her post-
divorce need. There is, however, no indication that she needs any-
thing; the child support payments alone may adequately supplement
her own income, and she may, of course, be independently wealthy.
Yet the case cries out for alimony, because the economic arrange-
ment the parties entered into at the inception of the marriage cost
her substantial earning power while permitting him to augment his.
Alimony is the only recourse. But that result contradicts Skelton; if
alimony is justified in this hypothetical, it must be because the wife
deserves compensation for her "deeds of the past," specifically, her
sacrifice of her career and the diminution of her earning power.47
The example of the Sacrificing Nurse illustrates what Ellman
means- when he speaks of "marital investment," and it would appear
that he has capitalized on the inadequacy of Skelton-like analyses of
alimony. Yet Ellman's theory suffers a fundamental inadequacy of
its own: His concept of "marital investment" is too narrow. Consider
this example:
The Frustrated Writer. Alimony Based on Unjust Enrichment.
Husband and Wife met in college at Yale, where they were class-
mates. Husband had majored in journalism, had graduated magna
cum laude, and upon graduation had immediately landed a well-
paying job with a Chicago-based magazine. Wife, on the other
hand, had immediately entered the Chicago Law School, where she
served as an editor on the Law Review. After her graduation from
law school the parties married and settled in Chicago. Wife began
employment soon thereafter as an associate in a major Chicago
firm for the then-astronomical sum of $40,000 per year.
Seven years later Wife became a partner at the same firm, and
46. Maine law prefers a division of marital property to alimony as an equitable
means to end divorcing spouses' financial relationship. See John C. Sheldon, Toward
a Coherent Interpretation of Maine's Marital Property Act, 43 ME. L. REv. 13, 40
(1991).
47. Skelton wrongly assumed that "need" can be defined easily. It cannot:
Are we to focus on what sum, if any, is necessary to keep the spouse in
question out of poverty, as defined by the official poverty level or by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics' budget for a low-income household? Or is need
more of an "opportunity" or "transitional" notion, such as what is needed
for someone to take steps to become reasonably self-sufficient (such as to go
to school, or to have job training, or to have time to pull one's life to-
gether)? Or does need have psychological overtones that make it important
for people not to descend to a significantly lower income/social class? On
this latter view, because people become accustomed to certain life-styles,
they soon "need" more money than they might otherwise.
Sugarman, supra note 14, at 153.
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her annual income then exceeded $250,000. Meanwhile, Husband
had tired of his job, but had no alternative job prospects with any
Chicago-based publications. He had generous offers from the staffs
of two different New York-based magazines (one for $125,000 per
year, the other for $112,000), but he would have had to move there
and Wife did not want to leave her Chicago firm. Because of Wife's
substantial income, the parties decided instead that this was the
time for Husband to complete and attempt to publish the novel
that he had been working on in his spare time for several years.
Therefore, he quit his job and began writing on his own, full time,
in Chicago.
Wife has now filed for divorce. She is earning about $650,000 per
year. Husband, on the other hand, has failed to find a publisher for
his now-completed novel, and has published only occasional arti-
cles in the ten years since he went out on his own. His annual in-
come over the past five years from his publications has averaged
$12,500, and he has no present, significant prospects for publica-
tion. In early 1991 he began looking for work in the Chicago area,
but the recession had hit his industry hard and he was unable to
find anything paying over $30,000 per year. He took what he could
find, and now lives in a $500 per month apartment twelve miles
south of the city.
Wife, on the other hand, continues to live in downtown Chicago
in the parties' $14,000 per month high-rise apartment overlooking
the shore of Lake Michigan. They own two BMWs, which cost a
total of $75,000 per year to insure and garage. They own no real
estate. They have a wine collection worth about $10,000. They each
own a complete and expensive wardrobe. Because they had in-
vested heavily in junk bonds, their total investment portfolio is
now worth only about $50,000. Wife had begun speculating on
paintings about five years ago, and has about twenty works of art
in her collection; their value may range from a low of $15,000 to a
high of $60,000, depending on how sanguine the appraiser is. The
parties are both forty years old, and they have no children.
If Ellman is right, then Husband is not entitled to any alimony
from Wife because there is simply no "marital investment" here; the
parties never had a mutual, interrelated plan for the maximization
of their family wealth.4 8 By staying home and writing, Husband was
not making a "marital investment;" he was taking advantage of
Wife's affluent employment to develop an independent career. Nor
can his fling at freelance writing be fairly called an investment; if
48. See Ellman, supra note 39, at 51:
I use the term "marital investment" for the claimworthy conduct giving rise
to a compensable loss in earning capacity. A system of alimony that com-
pensates the wife who has disproportionate postmarriage losses arising from
her marital investment protects marital decisionmaking from the poten-
tially destructive pressures of a market that does not value marital invest-
ment as much as it values career enhancement.
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anything, it was a gamble.
Yet the fact remains that it was Wife's gamble as well as Hus-
band's-if he had succeeded she would have benefitted substan-
tially. Even if this scheme does not fit Ellman's theory precisely, and
even if Ellman would not award this husband any alimony, there
seems to be an intuitive call for alimony here. This is not simply
because Husband needs Wife's support in order to get back on his
financial feet after a decade of unemployment (the argument of his
need may be diluted by an award of marital property to him).4'
More compelling are the facts that the Wife pursued her career and
developed enormous earning power during the marriage; that she
gained this benefit at least partially at Husband's expense because
he accommodated her career by agreeing to stay in Chicago, where
his employment prospects were poorer than they were elsewhere;
and that it seems unjust to disallow him compensation for his Wife's
financial gain under such circumstances.
The argument for Husband's alimony is essentially the contract
theory of unjust enrichment. In fact, it has been suggested that un-
just enrichment is the foundation for modern theories of alimony in
general,50 and Ellman's theory of alimony in particular. 1 Indeed, it
seems that a theory of unjust enrichment-reliance by one party,
creating a benefit to one party and a detriment to the relying party,
resulting in circumstances suggesting injustice-may provide a solu-
tion to all of the factual problems we have postulated above. In the
last of the three hypotheticals, the Frustrated Writer, we have al-
ready proposed why this is so. And in the case of the Sacrificing
Nurse, the issue of detrimental reliance is so strong that the uncer-
tainty of the wife's need hardly rises to a debatable issue.
This brings us back to the Diabetic Schoolteacher. Analyzed
under the unjust enrichment theory that we have been exploring,
the facts do not present a case for alimony. Although Wife devel-
oped an independent career during the marriage, she did not do so
49. The availability of marital property to satisfy Husband's post-divorce need is
uncertain in this case, because most of it is not in liquid (in the fiscal sense) form,
and its value is uncertain. Illinois has the same marital property statute as Maine and
shares Maine's preference, derived from the "clean-break theory" of divorce, for an
inequitable division of marital property over an award of alimony. See Sheldon,
supra note 46, at 47.
50. See Krauskopf, supra note 13, at 260 ("In its broadest sense, the theory justi-
fying a goal of fairly sharing personal gains and losses due to the marriage is preven-
tion of unjust enrichment."). (Footnote omitted.)
51. See June Carbone, Economics, Feminism and the Reinvention of Alimony: A
Reply to Ira Ellman, 43 VAND. L. REv. 1463, 1479-80 (1990):
Elman may have chosen to eschew the restitution label in order to concen-
trate on the lower earning spouse's loss (reliance) rather than the other
spouse's gain (unjust enrichment). . . . [A]s long as the theory permits
compensation of losses only when they are no greater than the presumed
benefits, the theory will be a restitution and not a reliance system.
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at the expense, or to the detriment, of Husband. Absent his detri-
mental reliance, he is not eligible for alimony.
If this seems harsh, it is because the Schoolteacher's potential
need is compelling. We acknowledge that, under similar facts, the
Law Court has found such need an appropriate basis for at least
nominal alimony.52 We hesitate to embrace the court's decision in
that case, however, because the court did not discuss the theory of
alimony which led to its decision. If the court based its decision on a
theoretical standard, it reversed the trial court for a deviation from
that standard. If there was no theoretical standard, the court may
have substituted its own opinion about an appropriate result for the
trial court's.53 That the court is empowered to do that cannot be
52. In Pongonis v. Pongonis, 606 A.2d 1055 (Me. 1992), the parties were divorced
after 17 years of marriage, at a time when their children were 16 and 11. For the
previous 15 years the wife had been working at a hospital, and was earning about
$18,500 at the time of the divorce hearing. The husband then had 12 years in with the
state department of transportation, and was earning about $23,500. Both parties had
vested pensions, and the wife had been a regular contributor to Social Security.
For the nine years prior to the divorce the wife had been suffering a panic disorder
and major depression, requiring her hospitalization. Despite present remission, her
symptoms and her hospitalization were expected to return. Apparently, this fact led
to an award of custody to the husband (whether through agreement or after contested
hearing the decision does not say), along with an order that the wife pay child sup-
port of $75 per week. The parties were awarded their respective pensions, but the
husband got the remaining, major assets: the house (net value about $60,000) and the
proceeds from the sale of the boat ($10,000). The husband was ordered to pay marital
debts totalling about $68,500, whereas the wife had to pay marital debts totalling a
little over $11,000.
The trial court denied the wife any alimony, finding:.
[T]he evidence was clear and convincing that neither the marriage or [the
husband] exacerbated [the wife's] medical condition. Furthermore, the
Court finds that [the wife] has always been able to work, and has lost no
income over the term of this marriage, as a result of her medical condition.
In light of the substantial debt this Court has ORDERED [the husband) to
pay, I find it would be unjust to ORDER payment of alimony. Therefore,
alimony shall not be awarded to either party.
Id. at 1059.
On appeal, the superior court reversed the trial court's ruling on alimony, ordering
$1 per year, and the Law Court affirmed. The court held, in part, that there was
ample evidence in the record concerning [the wife's] serious medical condi-
tion that could again require extended hospitalization. The undisputed evi-
dence before the court was that during her previous hospitalizations she
lost no income because of her accumulated sick leave. Given her medical
history, an uninterrupted flow of income in the past is not a dependable
indicator of an uninterrupted flow of income in the future. Nor can it be
said that Joseph's present inability to pay alimony justifies the preclusion
of this issue from future review by the court should Lois on proper motion
be able to establish her need and Joseph's then ability to pay.
Id.
53. The court approached identifying the theory of alimony upon which it was
relying in this sentence: "We have previously stated that we do not view an award of
one dollar a year alimony as establishing the recipients continuing need; however, it
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doubted, but if the court did so, the decision offers no persuasive
precedential effect.
Nevertheless, we recognize that the issue of post-divorce need is a
staple in alimony law, and it is not easily dismissed. If, as we have
suggested, need is an inadequate theoretical basis for alimony
awards, is our proposal really better? We explore that question
through a couple of other hypotheticals.
The Classic Homemaker: Detrimental Reliance as an Element of
Unjust Enrichment.
Husband and Wife are fifty-eight. They were married in 1953,
right after their mutual graduation from high school. Husband im-
mediately went to work at the local paper mill, where he has
worked ever since. Wife, on the other hand, stayed home, because
she gave birth to their first child ten months after their wedding.
Four more children followed, the last born in 1965. She has never
worked out of the home, but instead raised the children and at-
tended to homemaking chores. Husband now earns $68,000 as fore-
man on the mill's Number One paper machine. He has a vested
pension now worth about $250,000 (he is eligible to retire now, but
admits that he will continue working at least until age sixty-two).
The parties have a home with a net worth of $90,000, a vacation
cabin on four acres near a ski area, with a net worth of $60,000,
three vehicles and a camper trailer. Their total mortgage debt is
$45,000: $32,000 on the home, none on the cabin, and $13,000 on
two of the cars. They seek a divorce on the ground of irreconcilable
differences.
At first blush, Wife's post-divorce need is the obvious basis for the
inevitable alimony award in this case. Yet we can befog that issue
somewhat if we inject the following facts: Wife inherited $220,000
from her mother last year. Should this change the result? If need is
the governing standard, it must, because Wife's income from the in-
heritance (cautiously invested to produce a reasonable rate of re-
turn) plus her share of the marital property should produce a satis-
factory standard of living for her.
But that result is essentially unfair. It was her reliance on the
strength of her marriage that kept her at home and deprived her of
the opportunity to build a career that would support her after di-
vorce, and her husband benefitted from that reliance because she
kept the parties' household and tended their children for him. Now
that her reliance has turned out to be potentially detrimental to her,
it would seem unfair to deny her a remedy. Furthermore, it seems
odd to assert that she should have to depend on her family's assets
to support her when her marital relationship produced an asset-her
does permit the trial court to modify the award on an appropriate showing of a
change of circumstances." Id. It appears from this language that post-divorce need
was the principle upon which the court's decision turned. See supra note 52 and ac-
companying text.
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husband's earning power5-that is sufficient to do so. Ultimately, it
seems unjust to allow Husband to walk away from this marriage
with sole possession of its greatest economic product.
We emphasize that we are not advocating an award of alimony to
Wife in this case; whether she is awarded any alimony, and in what
amount, will depend on many considerations, including the relative
financial needs of the parties. The marital relationship in this case
does present, however, a theoretical case for alimony. We believe
that unjust enrichment offers a better theoretical basis for discrimi-
nating between those cases that present alimony issues and those
that do not, than does need.
Nor does need satisfactorily address the issues in this case:
The Sightless Welder. Need and Detrimental Reliance Compared.
Husband and Wife met on the job at the Bath Iron Works,
where both were employed as welders. They married in late 1988,
and moved into the home she was awarded in a previous divorce.
Their marriage proved a rocky one, however, and he had moved
out (and back in) twice before the marriage was two years old.
In February, 1991, Wife was diagnosed as suffering from brain
tumors that left her with this dilemma: submit to surgery that en-
dangered her sight, or undergo a radiation therapy that had no cer-
tain chance of success. Wife opted for the latter, but after two
months' treatment the tumors were worse, so she submitted to the
surgery. The tumors, diagnosed as malignant, were removed, but
the surgery cost her all of her sight in her right eye and all but
peripheral vision in her left. She cannot resume her job as a welder,
and since she only has a high school degree her employment pros-
pects, even with retraining, are poor. Her doctors place her chances
for non-recurrence of the tumors at fifty percent. The doctors do
not believe that the tumors are work-related.
Husband continues to earn $28,000 a year at BIW. He has sued
for divorce because Wife's prolonged, post-surgery depression has
rendered their ever-fragile relationship intolerable. There are no
significant marital assets.
Since the relationship of these spouses lacks any indicia of detri-
mental reliance, Wife's claim for alimony in this case can only be
based on her post-divorce need. Unfortunately for her, however, the
only theoretical justification for requiring her husband of such a
short duration to share her sudden financial misfortune is something
resembling the tort doctrine of assumption of the risk"" Persons
54. Calling earning power an asset does not mean that it is "property." Rather it
is a recognition of the economic significance of the employment status of spouses at
the end of their marriage. Professor Krauskopf, supra note 13, at 258, distinguishes
earning power from property by referring to the former as "personal gains" and to
the latter as "assets." Goldfarb, supra note 14, at 360, calls the husband's earning
power "often the couple's only substantial asset at the time of divorce." (Footnote
omitted).
55. See RFsTATE rNT SECOND OF ToRTs § 496A (1965): "A plaintiff who volunta-
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who marry run the risk that their spouses' sudden incapacity may
commit them to heavy and lengthy support obligations, irrespective
of the length of their marriage or the strength of their bond. As sad
as Wife's predicament is here, wouldn't it be unfair to Husband to
force him to share it, even temporarily, through an award of rehabil-
itative alimony?" Nor would it make any difference if we altered the
facts to give Wife a permanent means of support. For example, we
could say that her loss of sight was work-related, and she is a candi-
date for substantial, prolonged workers' compensation. That fact
does not alter the nature of the parties' relationship, however, and
since we doubt that alimony (or denial of alimony) should ever be
based on matters alien to the parties' relationship, we conclude that
it makes no difference whether she is self-sufficient or not: alimony
should not be available to her.
rily assumes a risk of harm arising from the negligent or reckless conduct of the de-
fendant cannot recover for such harm." The analogy of alimony liability to assump-
tion of the risk is imperfect for a variety of reasons, among them (1) the defendant
must act negligently or recklessly, whereas the alimony payee need not, and (2) the
plaintiff cannot assume a risk of which he is unaware (§ 496D) whereas the alimony
payor can.
Another analogy is to the contract axiom, pacta sunt servanda. See infra note 124
and accompanying text.
56. Rehabilitative alimony is temporary alimony intended to last as long, and cost
as much, as it takes for the payee to develop self-sufficiency. Maine's alimony statute
apparently recognizes such an alimony award. See Mx. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 721
(1)(D) & (E) (West Supp. 1992-1993). Others have criticized rehabilitative alimony as
a futility. See Goldfarb, supra note 14. Such criticism is especially compelling for
older, long-term homemakers: "One lesson from this research is that a woman who is
divorced after fifteen or twenty or thirty years of marriage can not recipture the
years she has lost in the labor force." Weitzman, supra note 11, at 390.
Our objection to rehabilitative alimony is that it is pure need-based alimony; we
object to any such award, be it temporary or permanent. See Krauskopf, supra note
13, at 262 (footnotes omitted):
Some persons interpreted even traditional alimony to serve only as protec-
tion of the public purse from supporting economically dependent ex-
spouses, but the fact of marriage itself is not reason to justify placing any
obligation on an ex-spouse. Even courts that in the first decade of reform
characterized maintenance as only "rehabilitative," for the purpose of
avoiding great disruption while the dependent spouse developed a modicum
of earning capacity and adjusted to a vastly lower standard of living, sel-
dom stated a theory for obliging the other ex-spouse to meet that need.
A related problem is the duration of rehabilitative alimony. As Professor Sugarman
states, at some point the obligation to support an ex-spouse ought to pass from the
alimony payor, but it is never clear when that point arrives:
[I]t is ambiguous how long a necessity-based claim ought to last. Certainly
at some point-but when is rather difficult to say-after the intimate con-
nection between the parties is long over and there has been time for the
dependent one to make choices about his or her future, it no longer seems
justified to single out the former spouse as the responsible party, even if the
other remains in dire need.
Sugarman, supra note 14, at 155.
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This is the ultimate problem with a need-based alimony theory.
For an award of alimony to be fair, it must derive from the nature of
the parties' relationship, not from things outside of it. This is why
we rejected Sally Goldfarb's thesis that alimony should be available
to compensate women for their disadvantage in the marketplace for
jobs. 7 The individual husband rarely has anything to do with the
marketplace (an exception might be an influential politician or an
industrial executive). It is unfair to make people financially respon-
sible for problems they did not create or worsen. Thus we disagree
with Goldfarb because she wants to make individual men, be they
captains of industry or sculptors, bus drivers or nurses, pay for a
problem that they may have little or nothing to do with.
An alimony theory based on need suffers the same inadequacy- it
is blind to the source of the need. Where post-divorce need is a
product of the marital relationship, alimony may be considered as a
remedy. But where the need is the product of causes that are exter-
nal to the marital relationship, forcing one person to pay the other is
the same as forcing the one to pay for something he or she is not
responsible for causing. That is unjust, and a theory of alimony that
promotes or even permits that injustice is as unacceptable in domes-
tic relations law as it is in tort law"8 and criminal law. °
For these reasons, we disagree with the Law Court's assignment in
Skelton v. Skelton of need as the theoretical basis for alimony. In-
stead, a fairer basis for alimony in a far broader range of cases is the
contract theory of unjust enrichment. We do not apply a contract
theory to divorce because we believe that divorce has anything to do
with the law of breach of contracts. It does not, any more than the
fact that marriage has been called a partnership means that it has
anything to do with partnership law.00 Instead, we borrow the con-
57. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
58. "In order that the actor become liable to another, it is necessary, among other
things, that his conduct be the legal cause of the invasion of the other's interest"
RESTATEm:ENT OF ToRS, SECOND, § 9 cmt. (a) (1964).
59. Criminal responsibility rests on the dual premise of voluntary conduct and
causation. See Ma. Rav. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 31(1) (West 1983) ("A person commits
a crime only if he engages in voluntary conduct."). See also ME. Rhv. STAT. ANN. tit.
17-A, § 31 (West 1983) ("[W]hen causing a result is an element of a crime, causation
may be found where the result would not have occurred but for the conduct of the
defendant ...."). For a discussion of "voluntary" conduct and responsibility, see
Meir Dan-Cohen, Responsibility and the Boundaries of the Self, 105 HARv. L Rv.
959 (1992).
60. The Law Court has expressly referred to marriage as a partnership. See Tib-
betts v. Tibbetts, 406 A.2d 70, 76 (Me. 1979) ('The shared enterprise or partnership
theory of marriage is a major guiding principle in the separation and division of prop-
erty at divorce."). Unfortunately, however, marriage is a partnership that has nothing
to do with partnership law. To begin with, a partnership is an association of persons
intended "to carry on as co-owners a business for profit." UNwos PART m mHP Acr.
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 286 (West 1983). Anyone who marries "for profit"
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cept of unjust enrichment from quasi-contract8 l and apply it to di-
vorce because it pivots and functions on the fulcrum of detrimental
reliance, which we believe adequately addresses the problem of do-
ing equity in cases of post-divorce need.
Nevertheless, there is one important aspect of unjust enrichment
that is common to both contract law and divorce theory: the unjust
consequence to be avoided is financial. Thus, for example, the Sacri-
ficing Nurse, whose husband left her with two young children to
raise by herself, is not eligible for alimony on the ground that raising
children can be a social inconvenience.6 2 Yet she may have another
ground for alimony, one not explored above. Earlier, we discussed
the possibility that by sacrificing her career (or at least part of it)
for her new family, the Nurse had established the prerequisite reli-
ance that, upon divorce, would turn detrimental and qualify her for
an alimony claim. Another financial issue, which we did not men-
tion, arises under these facts.
The Sacrificing Nurse, Epilogue: Other Financial Consequences of
Detrimental Reliance.
Six years after her divorce, her children are now seventeen and
fifteen years of age. The older child, Mary, is about to enter her
senior year in high school, where she is president-elect of the Stu-
dent Council and co-captain-elect of the girls' soccer team. In her
junior year, Mary scored in the ninety-eighth percentile in her Pre-
liminary Scholastic Aptitude Tests. She ranks third in her class of
125. Her principal college choices are Cornell and Princeton.
would immediately earn suspicion as a mercenary, a prostitute, or a fraud.
The comparison of marriage with partnership suffers even more if one tries to ex-
tend the analysis to alimony. As Professor Ellman has pointed out, a partner may not
expect payment of compensation from a former business partner except in unusual
circumstances-for example, where one partner had unexpectedly performed ex-
traordinary services for the partnership without proportionate contribution by any
other partner. If one extends this analysis to alimony, one must conclude that "ali-
mony entitlement comes not from marriage itself, but from efforts and sacrifices go-
ing beyond marriage." Ellman, supra note 5, at 38.
61. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 1, cmts. (a), (b) and (c):
a. A person is enriched if he has received a benefit .... A person is
unjustly enriched if the retention of the benefit would be unjust ....
b. . . . A person confers a benefit upon another if he ... performs ser-
vices beneficial to or at the request of the other ... or in any way adds to
the other's security or advantage. He confers a benefit not only where he
adds to the property of another, but also where he saves the other from
expense or loss....
c .... Even where a person has received a benefit from another, he is
liable to pay therefor only if the circumstances of its receipt or retention
are such that, as between the two persons, it is unjust for. him to retain it.
62. We also, therefore, reject the notion that there should be some sort of credit
against alimony allowed a husband who loses custody of his children, as if emotional
deprivation carried the same sort of monetary value that financial support does. But
see Jed H. Abraham, "The Divorce Revolution" Revisited: A Counter-Revolutionary
Critique, 9 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 251, 268 (1989).
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Nurse is Chief of Nursing at the local hospital, earning $38,000
per year, and has not remarried. She has been solicited to apply for
the job of Chief of Nursing at the Central Maine Medical Center,
at a salary of $75,000. To take the job, she would have to move,
since she now lives 110 miles, one way, from the Medical Center. If
she were to move, Mary would forfeit her elected positions, which
are of importance if she realistically intends to seek admission to
the colleges of her choice. As a result, Nurse has decided that she
cannot apply for the Medical Center position.
Nurse's financial dilemma is acute: in a little less than a year, she
will lose the child support payments she has been receiving for Mary
and, at exactly the same time, watch Mary matriculate to a college
where room, board, tuition and other costs can exceed $25,000 per
year. While there are abundant possibilities to avoid financial disas-
ter-Mary's father may voluntarily contribute to the costs of Mary's
higher education or, if he does not, Mary may be eligible for finan-
cial aid (and, in the Catch-22 of modern financial aid programs, if
Nurse takes the higher-paying job she might render Mary ineligible
for any financial aid, and have to pay all of Mary's college expenses
herself)-the fact remains that it would be in Nurse's long-term fi-
nancial interest to take the higher paying job. Yet she cannot do so,
because of entanglements created by her custody of her children.
This is another financial consequence of Nurse's marriage,1s and
one that is common enough that it could have been foreseen at the
time of divorce. She was then eligible to argue for alimony on the
basis both of her marriage's immediate detriment to her career (she
had given up a promotion to Deputy Chief of Nursing and had lost
seniority) and of this long-term detriment as well. The fact that she
might not have been able to prove at the time of the divorce that
she would suffer from this Hobson's choice means only that she
might have to return to the divorce court at a later date and take
advantage of one of the premier characteristics of an award of ali-
mony: it is subject to change."
In fact, it is this characteristic that uniquely offers a solution to a
frequently encountered problem.
The Doctor's Wife: Marital Property Distinguished from Detri-
mental Reliance.
The parties were married for more than thirteen years. While
Husband went to medical school, Wife worked as an elementary
school teacher. The income she earned went towards paying the
couple's living expenses as well as Husband's school expenses. Dur-
ing this period Wife obtained a master's degree in education as well
as a reading specialist certificate. Upon Husband's graduation,
Wife continued to work as Husband completed his internship and
63. Krauskopf, supra note 13, at 265.
64. See M. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 721(3) (West 1983).
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residency. Upon his entry into private practice, Wife resigned her
position to assume the responsibility of caring for the couple's
home. Husband is now an internist completing his third year of
practice, and he is grossing about $150,000 per year. His partners,
who are longer in the professional tooth, gross about twice that
much. Wife has been unemployed for three years. The parties agree
that divorce is necessary; they have no children.
Husband's medical degree is not marital property in the value of
which the Wife may share-because it is not property at all.s5 The
Law Court so held, on facts virtually identical to these, in part be-
cause the valuation of Wife's interest, based on Husband's future
earnings, "would be entirely speculative ... [and] would be prop-
erty acquired after the marriage . . .,,"
One can quibble over whether the Law Court meant that the pro-
fessional license is not "property" (which is what the court said), or
whether it meant that the license is not property capable of valua-
tion at the time of divorce, or whether the court meant the property
to be valued is the doctor's income which, acquired after the divorce,
could not be "marital" property. 7 In any event, on facts such as
these, Wife should be eligible for alimony for the reason that Hus-
band leaves the marriage with enhanced earning power that he de-
veloped during the marriage as the substantial result of Wife's ef-
fort, and it would be unfair to her to deny her some of that benefit00
The fact that her share of entitlement cannot be evaluated until af-
ter the doctor's earning capacity stabilizes means only that one of
the parties may have to petition the divorce court after the divorce
for an amendment of the original alimony award.
IV. ALIMONY AND INTERSPOUSAL TORTS
It is one thing to analyze how spouses should share marital bene-
fits realized after marriage. It is quite another thing, however, to fig-
ure out what to do about the harm that one spouse has caused the
other. The former issue, as we suggested in the Introduction, is pre-
ventative: using alimony to preclude a particular form of harm that
we have called unfairness. The latter issue, on the other hand, arises
after the harm has occurred.
65. Sweeney v. Sweeney, 534 A.2d 1290 (Me. 1987).
66. Id. at 1291 (quoting Mahoney v. Mahoney, 453 A.2d 527 (N.J. 1982)).
67. To be "marital," property must be "acquired" during the marriage. ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 722-A(2) (West 1981). See Tibbetts v. Tibbetts, 406 A.2d 70 (Me.
1979).
68. In fact, the Law Court pondered the propriety of awarding alimony under
such circumstances. See Bonnevie v. Bonnevie, 611 A.2d 94 (Me. 1992), discussed in
the text infra accompanying note 103. M. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 721(1)(K) and
(L) (West Supp. 1992-1993) would appear to justify an alimony award on such
grounds. See Levy, MAINE FAMILY LAW: DIVORCE, SEPARATION, AND ANNULMENT § 8.2
at 8-5 (1991).
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When we speak of "harm," we could be talking of two different
species of detriment: economic detriment, and injury to the person.
The former is the prodigal spouse syndrome: one spouse has wasted
assets to the economic disadvantage of the other. The latter is the
abusive spouse syndrome: one spouse has committed a tort against
the other. Alimony is currently available as a remedy for the former
Maine's alimony statute expressly permits the divorce court to "con-
sider," in addressing the question of alimony, whether "[e]conomic
misconduct by either party resulting in the diminution of marital
property or income" has occurred. 69 (Presumably, by authorizing the
court to "consider" such an issue, the statute intends to authorize
the court to do something about it too, through an award of
alimony.)70
The relationship between alimony and interspousal torts, how-
ever, is more complex. On a theoretical plane, the concepts of unjust
enrichment and remedying economic misconduct derive from an en-
tirely different social objective than does the concept of compensa-
tion for tort. The former seem akin to the principle in contract law
that seeks to enforce the intentions of the parties to an agreement
and that provides default remedies when the agreement breaks
down.71 The latter, on the other hand, is designed to vindicate a va-
riety of social policies none of which the individual has the power to
define.72 Alimony and tort seem like strange bedfellows from the
outset, and using the former as a vehicle to remedy the latter looks
69. Mx. Rav. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 721(1)(M) (West Supp. 1992-1993).
70. The text here represents a tacit concession that our thesis on alimony is not
perfect. We acknowledge this, in that the statute defines a purpose of alimony (cor-
rection of economic misconduct) that does not fit neatly into our larger view of ali-
mony as a vehicle for preventing unjust enrichment. Compensation for economic mis-
conduct bears a resemblance to compensation for a tort: the restitution serves as a
deterrent and, to a lesser degree, a retribution. See discussion, infra note 72.
There is a reason why the current alimony statute tells judges to "consider" the
variety of factors it lists, rather than telling them to award alimony on any one or a
combination of those factors. We have learned from interviews with several partici-
pants that the present § 1 of the statute was enacted in 1989 in response to a single
divorce case in which a trial judge's meager alimony award offended many members
of that particular Maine community, who worried that the trial bench did not under-
stand divorce law. They responded with an amendment that was intended to remind
trial judges of the variety of issues that can lead to an award of alimony. The amend-
ment made no pretense of defining the purpose of alimony, and this explains the
statute's modesty-and its strength. it tells judges what to "consider," but not what
to do.
71. See Carbone, supra note 51 (quoting M. PoLiNsKY, AN NTRODucTION To LAw
AND ECONObucs 25 (1983)).
72. Id. When alimony is awarded on a restitution theory it carries no moral
stigma; "the determination that the enrichment is unjust is no more than a conclu-
sion that the party retaining the benefit ought to contribute to the cost necessary to
obtain it." Id. at 1477. On the other hand, alimony awarded to compensate for eco-
nomic misconduct or for a tort carries an unmistakable opprobrium.
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more like a union of convenience than of principle.
The peculiarities of divorce law exacerbate this apparent incom-
patibility. The following hypothetical illustrates the problem.
The Anxious Wife: Alimony as Compensation for Tort.
Husband and Wife are both fifty-five and have been married for
twenty-five years. Their children are married adults. At the time of
the marriage, Husband had just finished his residency in surgery
and Wife was a registered psychiatric nurse. Since their honey-
moon, Husband has been obsessive in reminding Wife of her inferi-
ority and basic worthlessness. He occasionally emphasized his con-
tempt for her with physical violence, which always stopped just
short of her requiring medical attention. His drinking only clarified
in his mind his wife's faults. Wife has endured all for the children,
for his career and for their position in the community.
By mutual choice, Wife has not worked outside of the home
since the marriage. The parties have enjoyed a very comfortable
lifestyle.
Husband finally left Wife and filed for divorce. The marital es-
tate totals close to $1 million. The parties have agreed, so far, that
Wife will get the marital home, which is paid for, and one-half of
the parties' investments, which will provide a substantial stream of
income.
Wife is emotionally ruined. She leaves her home only to see her
analyst five days per week. Her analyst doubts that she will ever
work as a nurse again as a result of the effect on her of the abuse
by her Husband. Indeed, the analyst believes it would be malprac-
tice for any hospital to hire Wife, assuming that she could present
herself at a hospital and interview convincingly; the analyst doubts
that she could.7 3
That Wife has a claim for alimony from her husband is plain from
our previous analysis: she provided the homemaking while Husband
developed his career, and she deserves to share in his income after
the divorce. What is not clear is whether she should be awarded ali-
mony to compensate her for what might reasonably be deemed his
intentional infliction upon her of emotional distress-a tort.
The argument that he should compensate her for her injury is
compelling. Using alimony as a vehicle for making him do so, how-
ever, is less attractive.
If the focus of alimony is the sharing of burdens and benefits of
the marriage, an alimony award based on personal injury that one
spouse causes the other makes no sense, because no sensible spouses
ever contemplate personal injury as an objective or liability of their
union. As Professor Joan Krauskopf has stated,
Spousal support compensates for the inevitable economic effect of
socially desirable functions, homemaking and child care. In con-
73. For similar facts, but with no contribution by the husband to the wife's disa-
bility, see Dunning v. Dunning, 495 A.2d 821, 822-24 (Me. 1985).
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trast, a personal injury occurring between spouses is not an inher-
ent effect of marriage activities which society values. The personal
loss suffered is not a burden of the marriage in the sense of a nor-
mal incident of family responsibilities'
In short, unless and until injury emerges as a conventional conse-
quence of marriage, there will exist no ground for using alimony to
redress interspousal torts. Returning to our last hypothetical, the
Anxious Wife cannot seek alimony for her husband's tortious con-
duct, even if he caused her lost earning power, because there is no
corresponding economic benefit that the husband gained at her loss.
Certainly, facts could be developed at hearing to suggest that Hus-
band has, somehow, benefitted by his behavior, but absent those
facts there has been no enrichment for which Husband should have
to pay. Wife gets no alimony for her loss because the vindication of
a tort by exacting damages from the wrongdoer is not an appropri-
ate basis for an award of alimony.
If that conclusion leaves us somewhat dissatisfied, we should re-
member that the Anxious Wife ought to have an alternative remedy
available to her: she ought to be able to sue her husband for per-
sonal injury damages.7 5 There is, however, a theoretical bar to such a
suit, one that causes some7 6 to prefer alimony, for all its theoretical
inapplicability, as a means for her redress. The potential bar is the
combined consequence of res judicata " and collateral estoppel.7 8 In
the Anxious Wife's case, if she raises her tort claim against him in
74. Krauskopf, supra note 13, at 267.
75. The doctrine of interspousal tort immunity has been thoroughly abrogated.
See Krauskopf, supra note 13, at 267 n.13, and text, infra, accompanying notes 137-
39.
76. See Andrew Schepard, Divorce, Interspousal Torts, and Res Judicata, 24
FAn. LQ. 127, 130-31 (Summer 1990).
77. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF JUn MIMrs § 17 (1982):
A valid and final personal judgment is conclusive between the parties, ex-
cept on appeal or other direct review, to the following extent:
(1) If the judgment is in favor of the plaintiff, the claim is extinguished and
merged in the judgment and a new claim may arise on the judgment.. ;
(2) If the judgment is in favor of the defendant the claim is extinguished
and the judgment bars a subsequent action on that claim... ;
(3) A judgment in favor of either the plaintiff or the defendant is conclu-
sive, in a subsequent action between them on the same or a different claim,
with respect to any issue actually litigated and determined if its determina-
tion was essential to that judgment...
The Law Court has recently declared that a divorce judgment is not res judicata in
a subsequent lawsuit between the parties alleging an interspousal tort. See infra
notes 140-46 and accompanying text.
78. See id., § 27: "When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and deter-
mined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judg-
ment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties,
whether on the same or a different claim."
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the divorce either as a marital property issue 7 or as a basis for a
request for alimony, and the court decides that her claim is worth-
less, she may be barred from suing him separately in tort by res
judicata80 On the other hand, if she fails to raise the issue at all,
she may be estopped from suing him separately.81
A majority of states that have considered this issue has concluded
that the divorce and tort claims are separate and independent
causes of action, need not be joined, and are essentially exempt from
the principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel. 2 The salient
basis for this result is the difference in purpose between a divorce
action and a personal injury action:
The purpose of a tort action is to redress a legal wrong in damages;
that of a divorce action is to sever the marital relationship between
the parties, and, where appropriate, to fix the parties' respective
rights and obligations with regard to alimony and support, and to
divide the marital estate.83
A minority of state courts applies the "same transaction" test and
requires the divorce and the tort claim to be litigated in one pro-
ceeding." Justification for this position includes judicial economy, a
reduction in legal fees, and the policy of repose underlying the ap-
plication of the principles of res judicata85 This view seems artless:
tort claims hardly lie at the cutting edge of judicial economy, for
they invariably get bogged down in bickering about discovery and
79. "[C]hoses in action are property within the meaning of section 722-A(2) and
fall within the divorce court's broad power to divide marital property." Moulton v.
Moulton, 485 A.2d 976, 978 (Me. 1984) (citation omitted). See also Van De Loo v.
Van De Loo, 346 N.W.2d 173, 177 (Minn. App. 1984).
80. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 17 cmts. (a)-(b) (1982):
When a valid and final personal judgment is rendered in favor of the
plaintiff, the claim is generally merged into the judgment. This means that
the claim, whether it was valid or not, is extinguished, and the judgment
with new rights of enforcement thereof is substituted for the claim .... If
the original claim was valid, it is extinguished by the judgment; if it was not
valid, the effect of the judgment is conclusively to establish its invalidity.
81. Id. § 27, cmt. j: "The appropriate question, then, is whether the issue was
actually recognized by the parties as important and by the trier as necessary to the
first judgment. If so, the determination is conclusive between the parties in a subse-
quent action . .. ."
This rule is not immutable. It may be avoided if, among other things, "[a] new
determination of the issue is warranted by differences in the quality or extensiveness
of the procedures followed in the two courts or by factors relating to the allocation of
jurisdiction between them. . ." Id. § 28 (3). See also Note, Interspousal Torts and
Divorce: Problems, Policies, Procedures, 27 J. FAm. L. 489, 500 (1988-89).
82. Schepard, supra note 76, at 130. See infra notes 140-46 and accompanying
text for recent Maine case law adopting the majority view.
83. Heacock v. Heacock, 520 N.E.2d 151, 153 (Mass. 1988), quoted in Schepard,
supra note 76, at 131.
84. Schepard, supra note 76, at 131.
85. Id. at 131-32.
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are notoriously slow-moving. Given the importance of concluding
many divorces quickly for the sake of the parties' children, and the
expectations of many younger divorce litigants to remarry soon after
their divorce,"' it seems counterproductive to delay any divorce until
the tort claim has weaved its cumbersome way through the court
system.87 Furthermore, in these days of malpractice sensitivity, the
fact that the joinder of a tort claim with an action for divorce is
merely permissive actually necessitates it. This problem is particu-
larly insidious in states, like Maine, where the emerging tort of neg-
ligent infliction of emotional distress is enjoying increasing vogue."
By permitting parties to pursue interspousal torts in divorce actions,
courts would guarantee mutual claims for at least the intentional""
or negligent infliction of emotional distress (as well as every other
tort clever counsel can allege subject only to the toothless require-
ment of good-faith pleading9 ) in virtually every contested divorce.
That is not the path to judicial economy and the reduction of legal
fees.9 '
86. See Weitzman, supra note 11, at 204 (footnotes omitted):
The likelihood of a woman's remarriage is largely a function of her age at
the time of divorce. If she is under thirty, she has a 75 percent chance of
remarrying. But her chances diminish significantly as she grows older be-
tween thirty and forty, the proportion is closer to 50 percent, and if she is
forty or older, she has only a 28 percent chance of remarriage.
Weitzman goes on to say that "few divorced women remarry immediately.. . ." Our
almost daily experience in divorce court persuades us either that she is incorrect on
this issue or that she is too concerned about it: a woman's significant other is a com-
mon issue in divorce these days, which means that many women quickly regain the
economies of cohabitation soon after divorce, irrespective of whether they remarry or
not.
Goldfarb, relies on U.S. Department of Health and Human Services statistics to
conclude that "men are far more likely than women to remarry .... " Goldfarb,
supra note 14, at 369.
87. Divorces, being equitable actions, are heard by judges alone. Torts, on the
other hand, are legal actions for which trial by jury is available. im CoNsT, art. 1,
§ 20; Cyr v. Cote, 396 A.2d 1013, 1016 (Me. 1979). It is common knowledge that it
takes longer to get a case heard by a jury than by a judge. Except in these cases in
which the parties waive their right to jury trial on the tort issue, therefore, mixing
tort with divorce guarantees a delay in the outcome of the case.
Another source of delay is the forum in which such cases are heard. In Maine, the
District Court is usually considered the preferred forum for divorces because in most
such courts the dockets are less lengthy and the cases can be heard sooner. However,
the Maine District Court lacks the authority to conduct jury trials, and its jurisdic-
tional limit in ordinary civil cases is $30,000. M. REv. STAT. ANN. tit 4, § 152 (West
1989 & Supp. 1992-1993). Thus the joinder of tort with divorce forces the case into
the Superior Court, and in most counties this guarantees delay.
88. See, e.g., Gammon v. Osteopathic Hosp. of Me., Inc., 534 A.2d 1282 (Me.
1987). But see Cameron v. Pepin, 610 A.2d 279 (Me. 1992) (rejecting "pure foresee-
ability" in claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress).
89. See Vicnire v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 401 A.2d 148 (Me. 1979).
90. Ms. R CiV. P. 11.
91. Unless the party charged with the tort has insurance, there will rarely be any
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As for the policy of repose, it is a worthy concept that cannot,
standing alone, justify the exponential increase in the complexity
and duration of divorce litigation that would occur if torts became a
regular passenger. Counsel fearful of finding their clients' tort claims
barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel will understandably
attempt to join their tort claims with the divorce they file," and will
raise such claims as property in the affidavits of assets they file.03
Judges faced with such pleadings and property claims should order
the tort claims severed and, if fearful of the Law Court's still-un-
refined doctrine that divorces are not final until all property issues
are resolved,9" should award or set aside'A to each party his or her
tort claim, as yet unvalued, to be addressed at a later time.9 0
incentive for attorneys to pursue their divorce clients' tort claims because there will
rarely be a deep pocket to pay legal fees. Absent an individual deep pocket on the
other side, the policy of severing tort claims from divorces will weed out the vast
majority of tort claims.
Ordinary homeowner's insurance policies do not insure for intentional torts, such as
assault. At the time of this writing, such policies in Maine contained no exclusion for
the negligent infliction of emotional distress on a spouse. We predict that it will not
be long before they do.
92. Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 80 prohibits the joinder of any other claim for
relief in the divorce complaint. It does not, however, bar such joinder in the answer,
or in the plaintiff's answer to the defendant's counterclaim.
93. Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 80(c), in conjunction with ME. REv. STAT. ANN.
tit. 19, § 314 (West Supp. 1992-1993), requires the filing of an affidavit of assets and
liabilities prior to mediation in all cases that have to be mediated, and prior to trial
in all others.
94. Tibbetts v. Tibbetts, 406 A.2d 70 (Me. 1979). The problem that interspousal
torts poses to the divorce practice is recent. It is unlikely that the legislature that
passed the Marital Property Act in 1973 foresaw it and crafted the Act to require the
resolution of interspousal tort suits before divorces could be final. It is equally un-
likely that the Law Court of 13 years ago foresaw the issue and, therefore, it is un-
likely that Tibbetts-which is based on the court's interpretation of the Marital
Property Act-intended the same thing. Perhaps the Law Court will clarify this issue
soon.
95. The Marital Property Act requires that marital property be "divide[dJ" and
nonmarital property be "set apart" to the recipient. ME. Rav. STAT. ANN. tit. 19,
§ 722-A (West 1981 & Supp. 1992-1993). Whether a spouse's tort claim is to be "di-
vided" or "set apart" depends on whether it is marital property or not. For a discus-
sion of this issue, see Sheldon, supra note 46, at 16-19, 29 & 29 n.64.
96. If either party's tort claim produces a substantial judgment against the other,
the result will upset the divorce court's presumedly careful award of assets and/or
alimony. Thereafter, the parties will certainly return to the divorce court for a recon-
sideration of its previous award. An award of alimony is statutorily susceptible of
amendment. Ma REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 721 (West Supp. 1992-1993). An award of
property is not; the moving party must request that the court set aside the judgment
under Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). That rule, with its ossified good cause
and excusable neglect standards, is no sure-fire means to a new trial. It will take a
Law Court decision to make it one in the context of this problem.
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V. THE LAW CouRT's THEORY OF ALIMONY
As suggested above 97 the Law Court's recent cases involving ali-
mony have not discussed the purpose of alimony. The court's decla-
ration that "[t]he purpose of alimony is to provide maintenance and
support for the payee spouse" 98 identifies only alimony's effect, not
its purpose. And the court's often relied-upon observation, that ali-
mony "is intended to fill the needs of the future, not to compensate
for the deeds of the past,"9 is misleading. If the typical homemaker
spouse is to be awarded alimony, it will usually be because that
spouse stayed home and contributed less marketable skills while the
other spouse traded on a more valuable skill. Upon divorce, the for-
mer's "needs of the future" are the direct product of his or her
"deeds of the past;" the alimony award does "compensate" for those
deeds.
A coherent theory of alimony is essential if uniformity is ever to
be attempted and divorce litigation is to be minimized. A consist-
ently applied theory of alimony allows a competent divorce attorney
to advise his or her client concisely, to settle cases regularly, and to
forecast the outcome of litigation confidently. An inconsistent the-
ory, on the other hand, not only befogs the conscientious attorney
and magnifies the risks of trial, but it also encourages appeals be-
cause every stage of the appeal offers an opportunity to relitigate
the alimony issue. Much is made of the deferential standard of ap-
pellate review of alimony awards:100 the granting of alimony is ad-
dressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge and is supposed to
be reviewed only for an abuse of that discretion. 101 Yet appeals of
alimony awards have recently been frequent and successful. If this is
the result of the Law Court's piecemeal dispensation of a theory of
alimony, we applaud, confident this appellate practice will be re-
duced when the theory is received and understood. But this theory
is, as yet, difficult to discern.
In an attempt to analyze the Law Court's recent decisions on ali-
mony, we have found the analogy to contract law irresistible. Since
alimony, as we view it, is a remedy for the payee spouse, we have
used the outline of remedies found in the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts as a basis upon which to categorize the Law Court deci-
sions. The Restatement classifies contract remedies by the different
interests that they protect for the promisee:
1. Expectation interest- The promisee's interest in having the bene-
97. See supra text following note 12.
98. Lee v. Lee, 595 A.2d 408, 411 (Me. 1991).
99. Skelton v. Skelton, 490 A.2d 1204, 1207 (Me. 1985).
100. See Bonnevie v. Bonnevie, 611 A.2d 94 (Me. 1992); Gray v. Gray, 609 A.2d
694 (Me. 1992).
101. Pongonis v. Pongonis, 606 A.2d 1055, 1058 (Me. 1992), quoting Cushman v.
Cushman, 495 A.2d 330, 335 (Me. 1985).
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fit of his/her bargain by being put in as good a position as he/she
would have been in had the contract been performed;
2. Reliance interest: The promisee's interest in being reimbursed
for loss caused by his/her reliance on the contract by being put in
as good a position as he/she would have been had the contract not
been made;
3. Restitution interest: The promisee's interest in having restored
to him/her any benefit that he/she has conferred on the other
party.102
Our review of Law Court decisions on alimony indicates that the
Court has relied on each of these interests in fashioning a result.
A. The Restitution Cases
In Bonnevie v. Bonnevie, a 1992 decision, the parties had been
married for twenty-eight years. At the time of the divorce, the hus-
band was earning $45,000 per year, and his earnings were likely to
increase. The wife expected to earn no more than $12,500 per year.
The trial court had divided the marital property, including the hus-
band's pension, equally. The wife won temporary alimony until the
sale of marital home.10 3
The Law Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case to
the trial court for reconsideration of the "fairness of the economic
provisions" of the judgment, indicating that "the [trial] court's ali-
mony award is based on the erroneous premise that [the wife]
should rely on her marital assets to maintain her standard of
living.' 0 4
As in Bonnevie, the Law Court also remanded Bayley v. Bayley1'0
for reconsideration of the economic provisions of the judgment, in-
cluding alimony. In Bayley, the trial court had allocated the marital
property in approximately equal shares. The husband had received
assets, including the family business, worth $501,000, whereas the
wife had received about $481,000 in property, including the family
home. No alimony was awarded. The Law Court concluded that al-
102. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRAcrs, § 344 (1981).
Professor Ellman argues that contract law fails as a basis for adjudicating marital
dissolutions because the underlying promise cannot reasonably be defined. Ellman,
supra note 5, at 24. We agree, but also agree with the criticism that Ellman makes "a
classic case for expectation damages in order to advance a restitution approach, all
under the rubric of reliance." Carbone, supra note 51, at 1472. When a promise is
unenforceable, perhaps because there was no meeting of the minds to define the
promise, a claim in quantum meruit is allowed (A.F.A.B., Inc., v. Town of Old
Orchard Beach, 610 A.2d 747 (Me. 1992)), and the measure of recovery is, literally,
what the payee deserves for the benefit conferred on the payor. Belanger v.
Haverlock, 537 A.2d 604, 606 (Me. 1988). Ellman might better have argued that ex-
press contract fails as a basis for adjudicating marital dissolutions.
103. Bonnevie v. Bonevie, 611 A.2d 94 (Me. 1992).
104. Id. at 95.
105. 611 A.2d 570 (Me. 1992).
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though the assets were of equal value, the business was a source of
income and the home was an expense; thus the Court sent the case
back to the trial court with instructions to consider an award of
alimony.
Although these brief decisions offer sparse facts, it is clear that in
each case the husband left the marriage with higher earning capac-
ity than the wife, and that in each case the husband had developed
that higher earning capacity during the marriage. The wife in Bon-
nevie could earn little over minimum wage, which was probably due
to the fact that, with the parties' four children to care for, she had
not worked outside of the home during the marriage. The wife in
Bayley probably worked, if at all, in the family business, which was
now her former husband's, and may after the divorce have had few
employment prospects at all. If these assumptions about these cases
are correct, then the husbands had built up their earning capacities
at least to some degree at their wives' expense. The Law Court's
decisions to require alimony appear to have been based on its con-
cern for unjust enrichment.
B. The Expectation Case
In Pongonis v. Pongonis,10 8 the parties were married in 1973 and
divorced in 1990. They had children aged eleven and sixteen. The
wife had worked since 1975 in a clerical position at a local medical
center and was earning a little over $18,000 per year at the time of
the divorce. She had been contributing to social security and had
vested rights in a pension plan. The husband had worked for the
State of Maine since 1978 and was earning about $24,000 at the time
of the divorce. He had vested rights in the state retirement system.
At the divorce hearing, the wife's treating psychiatrist testified
that she had been under medical care since 1981 for a panic disorder
and major depression. She was hospitalized for forty-four days in
1987 and for thirty-six days in 1989. In the doctor's opinion, she
would suffer future severe episodes of panic disorder and depression
and would again require hospitalization.1 07
The divorce judgment required the husband to provide the pri-
mary physical residence for the children 08 and the wife to pay him
$75 per week as child support. The husband received the $60,000
house and $10,000 in other valuables, and was ordered to pay a debt
106. 606 A.2d 1055 (Me. 1992). This case is discussed at note 52, supra.
107. Id. at 1057.
108. Maine law does not permit the usual awards of custody and visitation. In
Maine, parties may share parental rights and responsibilities, or the court may allo-
cate certain parental rights and responsibilities to one party (which excludes the
other from sharing in those rights and responsibilities), or the court may award sole
parental rights and responsibilities to one parent (to the absolute exclusion of the
other parent). Ma Rnv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 752 (West 1981 & Supp. 1992-1993).
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of $68,500. The wife received a $6,000 car and was ordered to pay a
debt of a little more than $11,000.109 The court awarded no alimony,
for the reason that neither the husband nor the marriage had exac-
erbated the wife's medical condition, that she had always been able
to work, and that she had not lost income during the marriage due
to her medical condition. Because of the substantial debt the hus-
band had to pay, the trial judge decided that it would be unfair to
order him to pay alimony too.2
1 0
On appeal, the Superior Court affirmed the division of marital
property, including the allocation of debt, but ordered an alimony
award of $1 per year."' The Law Court affirmed and decided that
the fact that neither the husband nor the marriage had exacerbated
the wife's medical condition did not "mitigate" evidence that her
medical condition could again require hospitalization. The Law
Court concluded that the fact that she had not lost income in the
past because of her medical condition did not mean that she would
not do so in the future, just as her husband's current inability to pay
alimony would not preclude his ability to pay in the future. 12
If this marriage had continued and the wife's condition later re-
quired her renewed hospitalization, the husband presumably would
have continued to support her. The alimony award that the Law
Court ordered enabled the wife to request the same support. It fol-
lows that the court ordered alimony in order to permit the wife to
achieve the same level of support she would have enjoyed had the
marriage continued. The court awarded the wife her expectation in-
terest in the marriage.
C. The Reliance Case
In Prue v. Prue"3 the wife had won alimony at trial because she
had no capacity to support herself. The Law Court affirmed, and
observed not only that she had no "employable skills" but also that
"[d]uring their marriage her husband refused to let her work outside
the home."" 4
This might have been a restitution case had the court devoted any
109. Other personal property, including the retirement benefits, was divided
about equally. Pongonis v. Pongonis, 606 A.2d at 1057.
110. Id. at 1059.
111. Id. Maine law requires at least a nominal award of alimony at the time of the
divorce if the alimony is ever to be increased in the future. See Plummer v. Plummer,
137 Me. 39, 40-41 (1940) ("The general rule is that apart from statute the question of
alimony cannot be raised after a decree of divorce is granted, if it ... was omitted
from the decree without fraud or mistake."); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 721(5)
(West Supp. 1992-1993) (allowing modification of "a decree for alimony or specific
sum" that appears in the original decree).
112. Pongonis v. Pongonis, 606 A.2d at 1058.
113. 420 A.2d 257 (Me. 1980).
114. Id. at 259.
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attention to the benefit the husband had received from his wife's
single-minded contribution to the household. The court failed to
mention any such benefit, however, and without that element the
court cannot have been granting restitution.115 Instead the court em-
phasized only the wife's sacrifice-the negative. The wife had relied
on her husband's decision that she stay home, and her reliance
proved detrimental at the divorce. The court seems to have been
using alimony to reimburse her for that reliance.
D. The Expectation/Restitution Case
Gray v. Gray16 considered the wife's lifestyle during the marriage
as well as the benefits she had conferred on her husband. At the
time of the divorce, the husband was earning about $300,000 annu-
ally from his business enterprises and the wife about $55,000-
$60,000 from her executive position at UNUM. The trial court had
calculated the value of the husband's businesses at $900,000,
$400,000 of which was marital. It awarded $100,000 of the marital
estate to the wife and the remainder to the husband, and it awarded
the wife $1,500 per month alimony."'
The Law Court affirmed the alimony award because of the dispar-
ity in the parties' earning powers, the property distribution, and the
"very high life style" that the parties had enjoyed during the mar-
riage and that the husband continued to enjoy after their separa-
tion. The court concluded that although alimony was not necessary
for the wife's "bare support," alimony would allow her to maintain
the standard of living she had enjoyed during the marriage. 1 8 In
other words, the wife got her expectation interest.
The court also noted, however, that the wife had helped the hus-
band "get a start" in his businesses, and "thus contributed to his
earning potential."119 This sounds as though the court was awarding
her restitution. In addition, the court mentioned the husband's eco-
nomic misconduct: he had lost $57,000 gambling. 20 This was also
restitution, of a sort.1 2
1
In sum, we have found the Law Court awarding alimony to meet
the expectation interests of one spouse, the reliance interests of an-
other, the restitution interests of two others, and some combined
115. In tort, the wrongdoer need not have received any benefit in order to be lia-
ble for restitution to the victim. It seems unlikely that the Law Court intended to
grant Mrs. Prue alimony under a tort theory of restitution, however, in view of the
court's well-established disavowal of fault as a basis for alimony. See Skelton v. Skel-
ton, 490 A.2d 1204, 1207 (Me. 1985).
116. 609 A.2d 694 (Me. 1992).
117. Id. at 696.
118. Id. at 698.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 699 n.7.
121. See supra text accompanying note 69.
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derivative to a fifth. The court seeks to achieve fairness on the par-
ticular facts of each case, but there is no continuity in the court's
decisions because there is no apparent theory of alimony upon which
the court relies. What this means for parties to divorce is that, if
they can afford to do so, they may relitigate alimony at every stage
of the appeal.
VI. CONCLUSION I
Just prior to his selection of his fourth wife, Anna of Cleves, in
1538, Henry VIH sent this message:
His Grace, prudently considering how that marriage is a bargain of
such nature as must endure for the whole of life of man, and a
thing whereof the pleasure and quiet, or the displeasure and tor-
ment of the man's mind doth much depend. ... 122
Henry married Anna on January 6, 1540. The marriage was dis-
solved by convocation on July 9, 1540; Parliament approved the dis-
solution on July 13, 1540.12s
Henry was prescient to the extent that he believed that his "bar-
gain" could be broken: his early divorce of Anna of Cleves, shocking
to the sixteenth century mind, is commonplace today. This histori-
cal digression illustrates why we shun a contract theory of marriage.
Contract law imposes strict liability on the parties to a contract:
pacta sunt servanda-contracts are to be kept.124 Thus the obligor
under a contract is liable in damages for breach of contract even if
he or she is without fault for the breach, and even if the circum-
stances have made the contract far more burdensome or far less de-
122. FRASER, THE WIVEs OF HENRY VIII 287 (1992).
123. Id. at 327. Anna of Cleves was 24 years of age when brought from the Rhine-
land to marry Henry VIII. Henry needed a wife for a variety of personal and diplo-
matic reasons. When told of Henry's plan for a "divorce," she fainted, then submitted
and cooperated. Anna did not contest the "divorce" and agreed never to leave Eng-
land. In return, Henry gave her the following lifetime award: precedence over all the
ladies in England, except for his next Queen and his daughters, and manors and es-
tates worth the then-enormous sum of £3000 per year. Anna outlived Henry and his
next Queens, Katherine Howard and Catherine Parr. Id. at 326-27, 353, 407, 412-13,
428.
124. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF CoNTRAcTs, introductory note to Section 261
(1979):
Contract liability is strict liability. It is an accepted maxim that pacta
sunt servanda, contracts are to be kept. The obligor is therefore liable in
damages for breach of contract even if he is without fault and even if cir-
cumstances have made the contract more burdensome or less desirable than
he had anticipated .... The obligor who does not wish to undertake so
extensive an obligation may contract for a lesser one by using one of a vari-
ety of common clauses: he may agree only to use his "best efforts"; he may
restrict his obligation to his output or requirements; he may reserve a right
to cancel the contract. . ..
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sirable than he or she had expected. 125
Marriage "contracts," on the other hand, are easily rescinded. A
complaint of irreconcilable differences provides a perfect antidote to
whatever circumstances have made the marriage "the displeasure
and torment of the man's mind." Thus modern divorce law departs
dramatically from contract theory: the former guarantees the right
to rescind, which is anathema to the latter. There is no liability in
damages for breach of the marriage contract.
Or is there? The husband of the Sightless Welder"' would argue
that there is, if he has to pay her alimony: his continued payment of
support after failure of the contract, without regard to the circum-
stances of the breach, is indistinguishable from damages for breach
based on a theory of strict contract liability. He and the Welder
agreed to a shared existence, "for richer and for poorer, in sickness
and in health," and he still has to share irrespective of the intolera-
bly burdensome and patently undesirable terms of the contract. In
short, when alimony is based strictly on need, it is strict liability
damages right out of the Restatement of Contracts.
This illustrates the inadequacy of a theory of alimony based
strictly on need. Such an alimony theory is anachronistic, a throw-
back to times before no-fault, clean-break divorce. If no-fault di-
vorce is deemed fair-and its widespread enactment suggests it
is1 2 7 -it is because the right to back out of marriage is broadly ac-
cepted. It is theoretically inconsistent to recognize the free right of
rescission as a fundamental tenet of divorce law and, at the same
time, to apply a concept of strict liability to one incident of divorce,
alimony.128 Hence, our search for another theory of alimony.
Use of alimony as a vehicle for the prevention of unjust enrich-
ment seems more consistent with the current theory of divorce.
Viewed in this way, alimony addresses the needs of the future if
those needs are a-function of the deeds of the past: decisions made
125. Id.
126. See supra text accompanying notes 54-55.
127. Criticisms of no-fault divorce notwithstanding (see Wrmrzsbi, supra note 11
at 400-401), it is probably here to stay. See, e.g., Kay, supra note 32, at 4:
If the social and cultural norms that once supported the traditional model
of marriage are giving way to a new consensus that supports more egalita-
rian partnerships, the no-fault reform, although not itself the result of a
search for equality between women and men, may yet serve to stimulate a
more substantive approach to that goal.
128. Professor Ellman has much the same objection:
Reformers of the traditional fault divorce laws argued persuasively that
marriages fail because parties turn out to be incompatible for reasons not
sensibly thought of in terms of "fault." Judgments of "breach" share the
same burden. Because contract is designed to aid the party whose losses
result from another's broken promise, it is useless where we cannot reliably
define the promise.
Ellman, supra note 5, at 24.
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by two people during their marriage, which have economic ramifica-
tions that emerge at the time of their divorce when the economic
unit divides. The inquiry must not be solely prospective; rather it
must combine the past with the future, and it is only fair to award
alimony when the future needs turn out to be the unfair result of
the spouses' past acts. In this way, alimony is a result, a burden, of
the marriage of two particular people and derives from the specific
relationship that those people chose to pursue.
Thus, we also oppose awarding alimony to women solely because
they are disadvantaged in the workplace-a reality not caused by
the dynamics of a particular marriage. We propose awarding ali-
mony to women who are now disadvantaged in the workplace be-
cause they and their husbands decided, twenty years ago, that the
women would work inside the home, raise children, and promote
their husbands' careers. That decision works well for both parties
until divorce, where the wives' continuing need turns out to be a
function of their role in the past and where that role contributed to
the husbands' current ability to pay alimony.
The subject is complicated. We acknowledge other, plausible ap-
proaches to the problem of achieving fairness through alimony
awards. 129 Even if one accepts this theory of alimony-restitution to
prevent unjust enrichment-we have no doubt that one judge's con-
cept of what enrichment is unjust and what is not will differ from
another's, or that judges will disagree about how to calculate restitu-
129. One such approach would "grant an equal share of future earnings to both
spouses"-the so-called "marital equality norm." Ellis, supra note 37, at 492. Ellis
describes this theory this way:
The case for applying a marital equality norm to divorced spouses for the
remainder of their lives is a strong one for the long-term marriage. A long-
term marriage means that the spouses have committed themselves to, and
invesied their energies in, the marital unit and its sharing of economic re-
sources. For many women, whether or not they also work outside the home,
marriage and family come first and are the true "career."
. . . Measuring [the older wife's] "pension" by the values of the open
market (where women's work does not have a value equal to that of men's
work) rather than by the values of marriage (where a wife's work is consid-
ered to be of equal value to that of her husband) seems nonsensical and
unjust when the investment of many years has been in the marriage as ca-
reer and not in the marketplace.
. . . Were it not for the divorce, however, the husband would have shared
his market investment equally with his wife. In short, he would continue to
live, as he always had, in accord with a marital equality norm. Allowing him
to retain more than half of his future earnings after a long marriage would
mean that divorce has resulted in an economic windfall for him and a lower
than reasonable return on investment for her.
Id. at 492-93 (footnote omitted). To us, that sounds like a theory of unjust enrich-
ment specifically adapted to long-term marriages. Because, on a theoretical plane, the
marital equality norm approach to alimony is identical to what we urge, we have not
addressed it more fully.
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tion.130 But the inquiry has begun, the focus has narrowed, and the
possibility of a decrease in both disparate caselaw and, eventually,
appellate litigation is offered.
POSTSCRIPT HENPJSEN V. CAMERON
After a rare second oral argument and at least eleven months of
deliberation, the Law Court decided in March of 1993 that actions
for damages from interspousal torts should be tried separately from
actions for divorce. The case was Henriksen v. Cameron.131 The par-
ties had divorced in 1988 with an agreement, which the court had
endorsed in judgment, that prescribed the division of their marital
property and that denied each alimony from the other." Nine
months later, Henriksen sued Cameron for the intentional and neg-
ligent infliction of emotional distress-the result, the wife claimed,
of her husband's physical and psychological abuse during their mar-
riage.133 She accused him, among other things, of causing her emo-
tional distress by raping and battering her, of shattering fixtures in
their home while calling her a "lying, whoring bitch," of swaying
over her bed and threatening to "get" her, and of threatening to
beat her as his father had beaten his mother.13' The trial court di-
rected a verdict for the defendant on the issue of the negligent in-
fliction of emotional distress, but sent the claim based on intentional
infliction of emotional distress to the jury.135 The jury awarded the
plaintiff $75,000 in compensatory damages and $40,000 in punitive
damages."3 6
The defendant's appeal attacked the verdict on several grounds,
only two of which concern us here. 137 First, he argued that the doc-
130. Restitution could be measured as a percentage of the payor spouse's income,
or as the value of the payee's opportunity costs, or as the cost of boosting the payee's
future earning capacity. See Sugarman, supra note 14, at 156. Some states, like Cali-
fornia, have alimony guidelines, similar to child support guidelines, which incorporate
income, child support, and tax considerations; in such states, the incorporation of
restitution theories in alimony awards might prove difficult absent statutory
amendment.
131. No. 6461, slip op. (Me. Mar. 24, 1993).
132. Id. at 2.
133. Id.
134. Id. at n.1 and at 13-14.
135. Id. at 2-3.
136. Id. at 3.
137. The appellate issues that we do not discuss in this Article are the question of
the statute of limitations (Cameron argued that since the two year statute of limita-
tions barred the plaintiff's claim for assault and battery, she should not be permitted
to enjoy a six year limit for her "underlying" claim of the infliction of emotional
distress; id. at 13); the admissibility of evidence of physical abuse for which her cause
of action was time-barred (id. at 13-15); and the admissibility of certain expert testi-
mony (id. at 15-18).
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trine of spousal immunity, first adopted in Maine in 1877,188 barred
a tort suit by one spouse, or ex-spouse, against the other. This argu-
ment the Law Court dismissed because "[n]o valid public policy
suggests making the intentional infliction of emotional distress
through physical violence and accompanying verbal abuse during
the marriage privileged conduct." 13 9 In other words, spousal immu-
nity from tort has outlived its usefulness.
A second issue provided the Law Court with a more substantial
challenge. The defendant argued that, because the parties had had
the opportunity to litigate the plaintiff's tort claim in their divorce,
the finality of that action barred her present claim in tort under the
doctrine of res judicata.24 0 A majority of the court disagreed. Be-
cause divorce and tort are "fundamentally different" kinds of pro-
ceedings-41-the one triable to a judge alone in equity, and the other
triable to a jury; the one designed to sever marriages and the other
"to redress a legal wrong in damages" 142-- joining them is "impracti-
cable."1 4 8 Furthermore, compensation for such torts is unavailable
through divorce, because "courts are not allowed to consider fault in
the distribution of property on divorce" and "'[a]limony is intended
to fill the needs of the future, not to compensate for the deeds of the
past.' "" Thus, the plaintiff could not have litigated her tort claim
in the divorce; res judicata was no bar.
Writing for herself and Justice Rudman, Justice Glassman dis-
sented from the majority's position on res judicata. It is incorrect to
assume, she argued, that alimony is unavailable to compensate for
138. Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me. 304 (1877).
139. Henriksen v. Cameron, No. 6461, slip op. at 9.
140. The court stated the rule this way.
A prior civil action will bar a subsequent civil claim if:
1) the same parties, or their privies, are involved; 2) a valid final judgment
was entered in the prior action; and 3) the matters presented for decision
were, or might have been, litigated in the prior action.
Id. (quoting Beegan v. Schmidt, 451 A.2d 642, 644 (Me. 1982) and Kradoska v. Kipp,
397 A.2d 562, 565 (Me. 1979)).
141. Henriksen v. Cameron, No. 6461, slip op. at 10 (quoting Aubert v. Aubert,
529 A.2d 909, 911 (N.H. 1987) (emphasis added by the Law Court)).
142. Henriksen v. Cameron, No. 6461, slip op. at 10 (quoting Heacock v. Heacock,
520 N.E.2d 151, 153 (Mass. 1988)).
143. Henriksen v. Cameron, No. 6461, slip op. at 11.
144. Id. at 7-8 (quoting Skelton v. Skelton, 490 A.2d 1204, 1207 (Me. 1985)).
The majority's discussion of the marital property issue is virtually as brief as our
discussion of it in the text accompanying this note. The subject is also beyond the
theoretical scope of this Article. It might be useful, however, for practitioners to con-
sider that the majority's decision implies that interspousal torts are (1) marital prop-
erty that (2) lie beyond the subject matter jurisdiction of divorce courts (3) irrespec-
tive of language in the Marital Property Act, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 722-A
(West 1981 & Supp. 1992-1993), to the contrary. If so, we adhere to the procedure we
recommended in the text, supra accompanying notes 92-96, for addressing this issue
in divorce.
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tort injury; the alimony statute "vests the trial court with broad
powers to order one spouse to pay alimony to the other,""40 and the
plaintiff's continuing need for psychiatric therapy in this case is the
kind of need for which alimony may be precisely tailored. On a
broader basis, Justice Glassman took the majority to task for legis-
lating- the majority's "sweeping embellishment of the existing law
governing the marriage relationship should be left to the
Legislature."'4 6
COMMEmNTARY
For the reasons that are found in the text above, we agree with
the result the majority reached. However, we disagree with the posi-
tion that both the majority and the dissenters took on alimony. Our
primary concern is the fact that neither opinion attempted to
anchor its discussion of alimony to any theoretical ground. We know
now that the majority thinks that alimony should not be used to
compensate for tort, and that the dissenters think it should. But we
don't know why.
The majority relied exclusively on Skelton v. Skelton"17 for their
conclusion that alimony could not be used to compensate for tort.
That reliance was unfortunate for three reasons.
First, the precise holding in Skelton upon which the majority re-
lied was eviscerated by a subsequent amendment of the alimony
statute. Skelton, a 1985 decision, prohibited judges from awarding
alimony to a homemaker "to compensate a divorcing spouse for her
'years of service' in the past .... Alimony is intended to fill the
needs of the future, not to compensate for the deeds of the past."",8
The 1989 amendment to the alimony statute, however, expressly re-
quired judges to consider either spouse's "contributions .. . as
homemaker" when evaluating a request for alimony. 40 Thus, the
majority's specific authority for its position on alimony was not
persuasive.150
145. Id. at 10 (Glassman, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 15.
147. 490 A.2d 1204 (Me. 1985).
148. Id. at 1207.
149. Ma Rav. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 721(1)(K) (West Supp. 1992-1993). We assume,
of course, that when the alimony statute directs judges to "consider" something, it
implicitly authorizes them to award alimony on the precise basis of whatever the
judge considered-including, in this instance, the homemaker's contributions to the
household.
150. When Henriksen and Cameron were divorced in 1988, the alimony statute
had not been recently amended, and read, in pertinent part:
The court may decree to either spouse reasonable alimony out of the estate
of the other spouse, having regard to that spouse's ability to pay .... The
court may order instead of alimony, a specific sum to be paid or to be paya-
ble in such manner and at such times as the court may direct. The court
may at any time alter, amend or suspend a decree for alimony or specific
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The majority's reliance on Skelton is not our only concern, how-
ever. Equally disturbing is the fact that Henriksen's facts perfectly
illustrate our complaint, voiced earlier in the text,16 1 that the rule of
Skelton is superficial and unreliable.
We start with the observation that while Skelton prohibited
courts from awarding alimony on the basis of the recipient's deeds
of the past, Henriksen barred awards of alimony based on the
payor's deeds of the past. That the majority cited the former rule as
authority for the latter proposition is anomalous. In order to justify
excluding the recipient's deeds of the past from its alimony theory,
Skelton drew upon a long line of caselaw, some of which suggested
that "fault" had been dropped from the alimony statute in the
past.15 2 To conclude from such precedent that alimony could not be
awarded for "fault" is to interpret it incorrectly. What was dropped
from the statute was the provision that created a formula for deter-
mining the alimony award for a wife when "a divorce is decreed for
the fault of the husband." 153 this deletion left "as the sole purpose
of the statute the provision of financial support to the former wife
when necessary."'" Nothing in that statutory amendment, or in the
subsequent caselaw interpreting it, suggested that alimony might
not be necessary, or ought to be prohibited, if the wife continued to
suffer from having been battered or terrorized by her former hus-
band. Yet that is precisely the interpretation that the Henriksen
majority adopted.
Furthermore, in Henriksen at least some of the plaintiff's future
sum when it appears that justice requires it ....
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 721 (West 1981); see Henriksen v. Cameron, No. 6461,
slip op. at 9-10 (Glassman, J., dissenting). Thus the statutory provision that overruled
Skelton had not yet been adopted. This fact is immaterial to our argument because,
instead of limiting its ruling to the law in effect at the time of Henriksen's and Cam-
eron's divorce, the majority used Skelton prospectively.
151. See supra text accompanying note 47.
152. See, e.g., Beal v. Beal, 388 A.2d 72, 74 (Me. 1978) ("Section 1 of chapter 399
of the Public Laws of 1971 eliminated the fault provision from the alimony statute,
thereby leaving as the sole purpose of the statute the provision of financial support to
the former wife when necessary.").
153. The pertinent language, deleted from the alimony statute in 1971, read:
When a divorce is decreed for impotence, the wife's real estate shall be re-
stored to her, and the court may enter judgment for her against her hus-
band for so much of her personal property as came to him by the marriage,
or its value in money, as it thinks reasonable; and may compel him to dis-
close, on oath, what personal estate he so received, how it has been disposed
of and what then remains. When a divorce is decreed to the wife for the
fault of the husband for any other cause, she shall be entitled to 1/3 in com-
mon and undivided of all his real estate, except wild lands, which shall de-
scend to her as if he were dead; and the same right to a restoration of her
real and personal estate, as in case of divorce for impotence.
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 721, Historical Note (West 1981).
154. Beal v. Beal, 388 A.2d at 74 (emphasis added).
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needs were indistinguishably interwoven with the defendant's past
wrongs: there was substantial testimony about her need for continu-
ing psychotherapy to recover from the effects of his behavior.' 65 If
the plaintiff had presented this testimony to the divorce court to
support a claim for alimony, it would have been impossible for the
court to have considered what the plaintiff would have needed in the
future without considering exactly what the defendant had done to
her. No court could conscientiously have pondered her request for
alimony without evaluating whether the defendant's past acts really
justified her continuing psychotherapy. Thus the plaintiff could only
have received alimony to address her future psychological needs if
the defendant's past behavior warranted it. Skelton's formula (as in-
terpreted by the Henriksen majority), permitting alimony for the
former but not for the latter, has to be wrong.
Thus when the Henriksen majority relied on Skelton for its posi-
tion on alimony, the majority depended on caselaw that was not
only no longer law, but was unpersuasive authority for a proposition
that the caselaw probably did not support in any event. Yet the dis-
sent did not object to the majority's argument for any of these obvi-
ous reasons, and in fact the dissent's discussion of the alimony issue
is almost as theoretically sparse as the majority's.
The dissent focused on the language of the alimony statute as it
existed at the time of the parties' divorce 50 and as it exists now, and
on abundant caselaw that both preceded and succeeded the 1989
amendment, to conclude that there was "considerable doubt" about
the majority's position.157 Yet the dissent fell victim to the same
slippery slope that caught the entire Law Court in Lee u. Lee:'" the
dissent failed to distinguish between the considerations to which the
amended alimony statute directs trial judges' attention, and the the-
oretical basis for alimony. Thus while it is true, as the dissent ar-
gues, that alimony may be awarded to a spouse whose medical con-
dition at the time of the divorce suggests prospective need,'"0 that is
not the same thing as explaining why alimony should be available to
address that need. Nor is there any discussion in the dissent about
why alimony should be available as a remedy for personal injury.co
155. Henriksen v. Cameron, No. 6461, slip op. at 13 (Glassman, J., dissenting).
156. See supra note 150.
157. Henriksen v. Cameron, No. 6461, slip op. at 11 (Glassman, J., dissenting).
158. See supra text accompanying notes 29-30.
159. Henriksen v. Cameron, No. 6461, slip op. at 11 (Glasman, J., dissenting)
(citing Dunning v. Dunning, 495 A.2d 821, 823 (Me. 1985) and Pongonis v. Pongonis,
606 A.2d 1055, 1059 (Me. 1992)).
160. A thorough consideration of the distinction between "fault" as that term is
used in the phrase "no-fault divorce" and "fault" as it is used in tort is beyond the
scope of this Article, but it is worth mentioning briefly. "No-fault" divorce was an
antidote to the flawed procedures that accompanied divorce in the era when spouses
frequently had to fabricate accusations against each other in order to obtain divorces.
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In fact, neither the majority nor the dissent offers any theoretical
support for the position either takes on alimony. This fact suggests
that the battle among the justices must have been fought on differ-
ent grounds-for example, pragmatic ones. The majority was plainly
concerned with the effect that joining tort with divorce would have
on such time-sensitive issues as child custody and support.101 The
dissent never parried that argument per se, but responded by accus-
ing the majority of legislating. 162
If it is true that the justices were concerned with broader-or at
least other-issues than alimony, that would explain the majority's
truncated discussion of the alimony issue, and the dissent's failure
to strike at the obvious deficiencies in that portion of the majority's
"No-fault" divorce ended the obligation to prove that either spouse was to blame for
the fact that the parties had grown unhappy. See generally WEITZMAN, supra note 11,
at 1-20. As we argued in the principal Conclusion of our Article, "no-fault" divorce
theoretically implies that neither spouse has a duty to the other to make the marriage
work.
The tort concept of "fault," on the other hand, is indistinguishable from the con-
cept of duty-in the context of this discussion, the duty one person has not to harm
another. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 4 cmt. (c) (1965) (" 'Duty,' as the
word is used in all the Subjects of the Restatement, is a duty to conduct one's self in
a particular manner... whereby the interest protected by the duty can be made
secure."). "
There is no theoretical inconsistency between saying that, while neither party has a
duty to make the marriage work, both parties have the duty not to harm each other.
Thus, there appears to be no theoretical support for the majority's conclusion that
"requiring a party to raise tort claims in a divorce action ... would undermine the
policy premises of no-fault divorce." Henriksen v. Cameron, No. 6461, slip op. at 11.
Had the dissent approached the majority's position on a more theoretical plane, this
argument-which Justice Glassman did not employ, at least in her published opin-
ion-might have proven helpful.
161. See Henriksen v. Cameron, No. 6461, slip op. at 11: "[R]equiring joinder of
tort claims in a divorce action could unduly lengthen the period of time before a
spouse could obtain a divorce and result in such adverse consequences as delayed
child custody and support determinations." (quoting Stuart v. Stuart, 421 N.W.2d
505, 508 (Wis. 1988)).
162. At least since 1939, Maine's alimony statute has never defined the purpose of
alimony. Until the statute was revised in 1989, all it said was that "(tihe court may
decree ... reasonable alimony . . . ." (In 1939, the alimony statute read, in perti-
nent part, "The court may also decree to her reasonable alimony out of his estate."
See Bubar v. Plant, 141 Me. 407, 409 (1945); a 1977 amendment extended eligibility
to both spouses. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 721, Historical Note (West 1981)).
Thus, whenever the Law Court has attempted to define the purpose of alimony in the
past 50 years, it has had to fill in a blank in the statute and, thus to a certain degree,
it has had to legislate.
Because the Maine Legislature has, for more than 50 years, chosen not to fill in
that blank itself, one may conclude that it is satisfied with the Law Court's assump-
tion of that duty. Thus we disagree with Justice Glassman to the extent that she
criticizes the majority for legislating about alimony. It would appear that the Legisla-
ture may expect the Law Court to define the purpose of alimony. The reason may be
that the legislators appreciate how complex a theory of alimony is. See supra text
accompanying notes 13-17.
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argument. From this perspective, alimony was a speck on a large-
scale map, and was bypassed as the justices pursued more valuable
objectives.
VII. CONCLUSION IE
If issues other than alimony were paramount in Henriksen, we are
relieved because Henriksen is not, then, the Law Court's final word
on the theory of alimony. The majority embraced Skelton not be-
cause Skelton was ultimately persuasive of anything, but because it
was a means to an end-a vehicle to avoid whatever stumbling block
alimony represented. Likewise, Justice Glassman ignored the gaping
opportunities that Skelton offered her because there were more im-
portant things at stake.
This offers reassurance to those who may have interpreted Hen-
riksen as the Law Court's attempt to turn back the clock to the
Skelton era and to undo the 1989 amendment to the alimony stat-
ute. Skelton is irretrievably flawed and was statutorily buried. The
Law Court resurrected it, albeit unpersuasively, for the sole purpose
of severing interspousal torts from divorce. That matter decided,
Skelton may again be relegated to history, while we all await the
Law Court's next contemplation of the theory of alimony.
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